

The Will is the Key to Victory

A Monograph

by

MAJOR Nicholas P. F. Berchem B.Sc.
The King's Royal Hussars
British Army



**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
AY 01-02**

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Major Nicholas P. F. Berchem KRH

Title of Monograph: The Will is the Key to Victory.

Approved by:

Robert H. Berlin, Ph. D.

Monograph Director

COL James K. Greer, MMAS

Director,
School of Advanced
Military Studies

Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

Director, Graduate Degree
Program

Abstract

THE WILL IS THE KEY TO VICTORY by MAJOR Nicholas P. F. Berchem, KRH, British Army, 80 pages.

This monograph is a study of cohesion in the officer corps of the US Army. The basic premise is that the capability of an army is measured by its operational effectiveness. This has three components: physical, conceptual and moral. The monograph argues that the moral domain is the most important, and that within the moral domain the most important factor is cohesion. The study is conducted within the framework of the transformation of the US Army and argues that as the Army transforms, cohesion becomes more critical on the empty battlefield. The study focuses on captains and majors, since they are the ones who will turn transformation from a concept to reality.

The study is primarily based on novel research conducted by issuing a questionnaire to 150 students at the USA CGSOC, 150 students at the US CAS3 and 120 students at the British JSCSC, with the aim of comparing and contrasting the three organisations. The questionnaire covered some brief demographic data, and then included sections on cohesion (using social and task parameters defined in personal and group terms as developed by Widmeyer et al), operational effectiveness (defined in terms of the principles of mission command – unity of effort, decentralization, trust and mutual understanding) and opinion about factors affecting cohesion.

The data reveal that there is a significant difference in levels of cohesion between the officer corps of the US and British Armies and that this correlates to a difference in anticipated operational effectiveness. It further determines that there is a marked difference in cohesion between combat arms and CSS officers, particularly in the British Army. The monograph attributes this difference primarily to the US belief that leadership is the most important factor affecting operational effectiveness, vice British faith in morale. It also cites the less frequent socialisation of US officers, both with their peers and subordinates as a major factor and suggests that lack of opportunity and the pressure of family life may be responsible. The monograph identifies lack of trust as the fundamental issue in diminished operational effectiveness. The effect of homosexuals, women in the front line and drugs are also addressed.

The conclusion is that as the US Army transforms and learns to fight on the modern battlefield it will require a more cohesive officer corps than it currently enjoys. The monograph proposes that in order to facilitate the development of stronger cohesion the US Army might examine the concept of permanently task-organised battalions with a proto-British style regimental system. Further recommendations include, examining ways of reinforcing social cohesion at the heart of each battalion, delaying company command until officers reach field grade, placing more emphasis on self reliance through adventure training and examining the feasibility and desirability of military high schools.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS	1
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION	5
CHAPTER 2 - METHODOLOGY	14
CHAPTER 3 – RESULTS	22
CHAPTER 4 - ANALYSIS	27
CHAPTER 5 – RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION.....	45
Recommendations.....	45
Conclusion	48
APPENDIX 1 – Analysis Graphs (Entire Populations).....	50
DemographyCohesion.....	50
Cohesion	51
Operational Effectiveness	53
Opinion	56
APPENDIX 2 – Analysis Graphs (Combat Arms Only).....	64
Cohesion	64
Operational Effectiveness	65
Opinion	66
APPENDIX 3 – Analysis Graphs (CSS Units Only).....	68
Cohesion	68
Operational Effectiveness	68
Opinion	70
APPENDIX 4 – Kruskal Wallis Analysis Results.....	71
TABLE ONE.....	71
Comparison of JSCSC and CGSC Cohesion and Operational Effectiveness.....	71
TABLE TWO.....	72
Comparison of JSCSC and CAS3 Cohesion and Operational Effectiveness.....	72
TABLE 3.....	73
Comparison of JSCSC and CAS3 Opinion.....	73
TABLE 4.....	74
Comparison of JSCSC and CGSC Opinion	74
APPENDIX 5 - Questionnaire	75
BIBLIOGRAPHY	81

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

“A whole army may be robbed of its spirit; a commander in chief may be robbed of his presence of mind.”¹

The impetus behind this monograph derives from the author’s personal observations of US Army practices while attending the US Army Command and General Staff Officers Course (CGSOC) as a British exchange officer, between June 2000 and June 2001. The most striking observation was an apparent lack of cohesion within the US officer corps. Subjectively viewed, there seemed to be no desire to gather and discuss issues of mutual interest in a social or professional environment outside class. The focus was entirely on getting the job at hand done and on spending time with the family. This was in stark contrast to the British approach, which encourages officers to gather socially every day.

Allied to this observation was an apparent lack of delegated decision-making authority. Even routine issues had to be referred to higher authority for resolution. This was again a direct contrast to the British approach of devolved responsibility. From a British perspective, the two issues seemed closely related, since devolved decision making requires trust, trust is fostered by cohesion and cohesion is enhanced by mutual trust. In the environment of CGSOC neither trust nor cohesion was exhibited to any great extent.

Simultaneously it became clear that the US Army was embarking on a massive reorganisation, commonly referred to as “transformation,” aimed at revitalising its ability to fight. In British doctrine, the ability to fight is thought to be the product of three factors: the physical component (equipment and manpower), the conceptual component (doctrine and development) and the moral component (motivation, leadership etc).² Notably, the current US transformation is focused on the physical and conceptual components, but appears to be ignoring the moral

¹ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans and ed Lionel Giles, (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1910).

² United Kingdom Ministry of Defence. *Design for British Military Operations, The British Military Doctrine*. (London, 1996), 4-3.

component. A recent report by the Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study highlights this. Under the heading “What the field told us,” there are two clear statements that there is a “perception that micromanagement is pervasive” and that “there is diminishing direct contact between seniors and subordinates...(which) does not promote cohesion and inhibits trust.” Surprisingly the report’s recommendations mention nothing about enhancing cohesion and trust.³

The Chief of Staff of the US Army, General Eric Shinseki, when he addressed the CGSOC class early in 2001, clearly stated that he expected the young majors and captains in the audience to lead the way in transformation. It seemed to the author that the US Army officer corps, with its apparent lack of cohesion and trust would be stretched to realise the Chief of Staff’s aim. The thesis question for this monograph therefore is: “Does the US Army have the necessary cohesion among its officers to take advantage of the opportunities to enhance operational effectiveness presented by transformation?” The objective findings of this monograph suggest that it does not.

The US Army lacks cohesion in its officer corps and this lack of cohesion appears to have an indirect, adverse effect on its potential operational effectiveness. In reaching this conclusion, novel research was undertaken by issuing a questionnaire to US and British officers at their respective Staff Colleges. This monograph reports on and discusses the results of this research. The remainder of this chapter addresses some definitions, attempts to explain why cohesion is critical in a fighting force and explains why it is important to the transformation of the US Army. Chapter two addresses the methodology used to conduct the research and analysis. There is an explanation of the criteria used to measure cohesion and operational effectiveness followed by an explanation of the questionnaire used to gather the raw data. Chapter three is a brief overview of the results of the questionnaire. The main analysis is in chapter four, where three broad groups of

³ United States Department of the Army. *Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study Report to the Army*. Available from: <http://www.army.mil/features/ATLD/ATLD.htm>; Internet; accessed

topics are discussed. Areas of difference between the US and British Armies are examined first and their potential causes reviewed. Factors countering cohesion are then addressed. Finally potential means of enhancing cohesion are debated, including a regimental system, a renewed appreciation of the importance of social cohesion, adventure training and potentially the need to foster the concept of the military high school. Chapter five lists the recommendations of the paper and ends with a conclusion. But first the stage must be set.

To answer the thesis question “cohesion” must be defined. At first glance, this appears simple, as the Oxford English dictionary defines cohesion as “the act or condition of sticking together.”⁴ Unfortunately, as Guy Siebold, an eminent contemporary sociologist, points out in his review of the evolution of the measurement of cohesion, there is no academic consensus on the validity of this definition. This issue, along with its measurement, is discussed in the methodology.

It is essential to understand the importance of cohesion to the fighting capability of an army. In the words of Carl von Clausewitz, an eminent nineteenth century military theorist, the fighting power of a force is “...the product of two inseparable factors, viz. *the total means at his disposal* and the *strength of his will*.⁵ (emphasis is original). Combining this with Napoleon’s dictum that “the morale is to the physical as three is to one,” it appears that the will plays a dominant role in determining the fighting power of a force. Colonel S. L. A. Marshall, a US historian in the European theatre of operations during World War II, reinforces this when he says that in a typical American infantry battalion in Northern Europe, only twenty-five percent of soldiers normally used their weapons in combat, even when in range and sight of the enemy.⁶ It was therefore not simply enough to have a rifle; the will to use it was critical.

⁹ November 2001.

⁴ *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English* (1995).

⁵ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed and trans Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 77.

⁶ Colonel S L A Marshall USA (Ret), *Men Against Fire, The Problem of Battle Command in Future War*, (Gloucester Massachusetts: Peter Smith Publishing, 1978), 73-74.

While the will is critical to fighting power, cohesion is critical to the will. This is demonstrated in British doctrine on operations, which states that the will is attacked by pre-emption, dislocation and disruption. It then states that cohesion “is a quality that binds together (the) constituent parts thereby providing resilience against dislocation and disruption. It minimises vulnerability to defeat in detail and the adverse effects of pre-emption.”⁷ General Sir John Hackett, a senior NATO officer and noted author of the late 1960s and 70s, links performance directly to cohesion, claiming:

It is worth remembering that military practice is group practice. Many of the military forms which look so unnecessary or even absurd – the worship of regimental totems, the eccentricities of dress and custom, the cultivation of a separate identity for the group – these have been developed and are still dedicated precisely to the creation and maintenance of that coherence on which the effective performance of a group under pressure depends.⁸

Cohesion is not however, merely about “pride... adherence to an ideal...and esprit de corps.” It is more a function of “the feelings of belonging and solidarity that occur mostly at the primary group level and result from sustained interactions, both formal and informal among group members on the basis of common experiences, interdependence and shared goals and values.”⁹ The value of cohesion in enhancing combat power is fourfold. Firstly, by drawing a group together it sets a standard of expected behaviour from which individuals can only deviate at some cost to personal standing within the group. Secondly it sustains an individual with the knowledge that while others are relying on him to fulfil his role he can rely on them to fulfil theirs.¹⁰ Thirdly, as elucidated by Eric Hoffer, an American social philosopher of the 1960s, cohesion and its attendant totems and rituals “are designed to separate the soldier from his flesh-

⁷ United Kingdom Ministry of Defence. Army Doctrine Publication, Volume 1, *Operations*, (London, 1994), 2-6.

⁸ Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, *Serve to Lead – An Anthology* (London: HMSO, [undated]), 22.

⁹ Anthony Kellett. *Combat Motivation, the Behavior of Soldiers in Battle*, (Boston: Kluwer Nijhoff Publishing, 1982), 46.

¹⁰ Based on a concept developed by Stouffer S A et al in “The American Soldier: Combat and its Aftermath” *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II*, 2, (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1949) and supported by Colonel S L A Marshall in *Men Against Fire*, (Gloucester Massachusetts: Peter Smith Publishing, 1978).

and-blood self and mask the overwhelming reality of life and death,”¹¹ meaning that by becoming part of something greater than self an individual is more prepared to sacrifice his life for others. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it speeds decision-making and action. Commanders can develop plans free of having to document decisions to defend themselves if things go wrong and they are freed of much of the necessity to check on subordinates. Subordinates know they are valued and can be sure that the coordination of supporting elements has taken place. This all results in confident and high tempo execution.¹² In essence, cohesion develops trust vertically from subordinate to commander and most importantly from commander to subordinate, allowing free delegation. It also develops trust horizontally between peers, fostering unity of purpose and a desire to strive for common goals. The conclusion from this is that cohesion plays a critical role in developing the will to fight, thereby significantly enhancing fighting power. Since it has been shown that frequently the will to fight is more important than the means to fight, it could be said that cohesion is more important than firepower.

A brief survey of the history of warfare supports the idea that attacking the will is the most efficient means of defeating an enemy. Since the industrial revolution, Western armies and the US Army in particular, have relied on their overwhelming material might to achieve that aim. This proved effective in resolving amongst others, the American Civil War, two World Wars, the Falklands War and the 1991 Gulf War. In all these instances, the enemy tried to fight, or threatened to fight on equal terms, using the weapons and methods employed by the victors. Victory was gained because no matter what the enemy wanted to do he lacked the means to do it.¹³ The policy was less effective when dealing with an enemy that relied more on the will than on the material capability and attacked asymmetrically. These enemies avoided attacking the

¹¹ Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1951), 65.

¹² Jonathan Shay, “Trust: Touchstone for a Practical Military Ethos”, *Spirit Blood and Treasure, The American Cost of Battle in the 21st Century*, ed. Donald Vandegriff, (Novato, CA: Praesidio Press, 2001), p12.

¹³ The US Marine Corps expresses exactly this viewpoint in Marine Corps Doctrine Publication 1. available from: <http://wwwdoctrine.usmc.mil>/ Internet; accessed 26 February 2002.

friendly force strengths and instead indirectly attacked their will, which they perceived as a vulnerability. Examples of these cases are the Boer War, Vietnam War and Northern Ireland. In each of these instances, friendly material might have played a part, but not as the principal tool. In the Boer War, it was not until the British under Field Marshal the Earl Kitchener of Khartoum, began to adopt the tactics and techniques of the Boers, and to develop “concentration camps” that the Boer will crumbled.¹⁴ In Vietnam the US was never able to overcome the Vietcong will,¹⁵ while in Northern Ireland the British still grapple with the issues of bending the will of both Republicans and Unionists.

If these principles apply to the enemy, they must equally apply to the US Army. Cohesion therefore, could play an important role in reinforcing the will of the US Army to resist and overcome an enemy relying chiefly on its will. Whilst it is probably impossible and undesirable to engender fanatical dedication in any western army, it should be possible to enhance cohesion and the collective will to win by emphasising some aspects of soldiering that may currently be neglected.

One example that demonstrates the historical neglect of cohesion in the US Army is that of care for soldiers’ families when the troops are deployed on operations. The description given by General Hal Moore (author of *We Were Soldiers Once and Young*, and a highly decorated Vietnam veteran) of the callous treatment of the families of his 1st Battalion of the 7th Cavalry, when they deployed is testament to this.¹⁶ While this particular issue has been resolved, the mental attitude remains in some respects. The army needs to become a surrogate family if officers and men are not to be distracted from their purpose by issues at home. As Lord Moran, physician to Sir Winston Churchill and author of a definitive study of courage put it, “When a

¹⁴ Lawrence James, *The Rise and Fall of the British Empire*, (London: Little, Brown and Co; New York: St Martin’s Griffin, 1994): 267.

¹⁵ Stanley Karnow, *Vietnam, A History*, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1983).

¹⁶ Harold G Moore, Lt Gen USA (Ret), *We Were Soldiers Once and Young*, (New York: Random House, 1992) 323 ff.

soldier is at war, his mind should be at peace.”¹⁷ The issue is developing a situation in which the deploying troops are prepared to entrust the care of their spouses and families to the Army while they are away. This is difficult to achieve if a unit has not been in the habit of developing a cohesive spirit in barracks. Part of developing cohesion is to encourage social cohesion between the spouses, so that they can do more to support themselves when the troops are deployed, thereby relieving the soldiers of some anxiety and making them more combat effective.

The role of cohesion in developing fighting power has been demonstrated, but it remains to be shown why this is important for US Army transformation. Transformation is a concept that relies on the manoeuvrist approach, which is defined as “an approach to operations in which shattering the enemy’s overall *cohesion* and will to fight is paramount. It calls for an attitude of mind in which doing the unexpected, using initiative and seeking originality is combined with a ruthless determination to succeed”¹⁸ (Italics supplied). At the heart of the manoeuvrist approach is mission command. Mission command is the concept of telling subordinates “what to achieve and why, rather than what to do and how,” within a commander’s intent. This in turn relies on initiative and confidence among junior officers, which requires significant delegation of decision-making authority if it is to succeed. Delegation relies on trust. The commander must be able to trust his subordinates to act within his intent, while subordinates must trust the commander to devise a battle-winning plan. This kind of trust is best developed in a cohesive organisation. Thus, cohesion is critical, as it is the precondition that enables an officer corps to exercise mission rather than directive command.

¹⁷ Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, *Serve to Lead – An Anthology* (London: HMSO, [undated]), 62.

¹⁸ United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, *Design for British Military Operations, The British Military Doctrine*, (London, 1996), 4-21. While this is extracted from British doctrine the USMC uses almost identical words in MCDP 1 available from: <http://wwwdoctrine.usmc.mil> Internet; accessed 26 February 2002.

Mission command will be essential on the “empty battlefield,”¹⁹ which will become emptier as fewer platforms and men are required to operate in increasingly larger areas. Indeed, it is very likely that many small units on the future battlefield will be out of visual contact with their neighbours for long periods. This will require junior officers (and soldiers) to take on significantly more responsibility, since where once a battalion occupied a front of five kilometres, a troop will now be operating. In order to be able to seize fleeting opportunities, junior commanders will have to understand the intent of their commander completely, while the commander will have to trust them absolutely to make the correct decision. All this will require high levels of cohesion, for commanders to be prepared to assign subordinates critical tasks without direct supervision. This is an issue of trust.

To achieve this level of cohesion the traditional US and British view of the battalion may need to be reconsidered. Currently a battalion is a pure, single arm entity, expert in its own battlefield operating system but relatively impotent without external support. In order to enhance flexibility, the future battalion may need to be permanently task-organised to meet a variety of threats, or more likely, due to the difficulty of training lots of small, specialist detachments vice one large specialist battalion, the current single battalion system will survive, but it will have to be able to reorganise rapidly to meet developing situations. Under these circumstances the cohesion of officers of all branches within a brigade or division will directly affect the combat effectiveness of the force, since their ability to work together quickly will dictate the tempo at which the formation can operate.

Finally, this monograph concentrates almost exclusively on relatively junior officers. This is because it is the officers, particularly the current majors and captains, who will have to overcome the difficulties and turn transformation from a concept into reality. As the combined land force commander for the invasion of Normandy in 1944, Field Marshall the Viscount

¹⁹ James J Schneider, *Vulcan’s Anvil, The American Civil War and the Emergence of Operational Art*, (Fort Leavenworth: Command and General Staff College, 1991).

Montgomery of Alamein, wrote: "Inspiration and guidance must come from above and must permeate throughout the force. Once this is done there is never any difficulty, since all concerned will go ahead on the lines laid down; the whole force will thus acquire balance and *cohesion*, and the results on the day of battle will be very apparent"²⁰ (italics added). It is the officers' "ruthless determination to succeed" that overcomes friction and drives a military force through time and space to achieve its mission.

Following this logic it appears that a cohesive officer corps will be essential if the full benefits are to be reaped from transformation. The primary aim of this paper therefore is to determine if the US Army has a cohesive officer corps now and if not what might be done to enhance cohesion in readiness for "transformation".

²⁰ Field Marshall the Earl Montgomery of Alamein. *High Command in War*. (London: privately printed, 1945), 21.

CHAPTER 2 - METHODOLOGY

“The scientific mind does not so much provide the right answers as ask the right questions.”²¹

There are two variables in the thesis question: cohesion and operational effectiveness.

The concept of cohesion has been extensively studied and the current thinking is clearly summarised in an article by Guy Siebold, an eminent social scientist and member of the US Army Research Institute, entitled “The Evolution of the Measurement of Cohesion.”²² Unfortunately, as Siebold remarks in his introduction, the crucial areas of definition and measurement remain unclear. Even E. A. Shils and M. Janowitz, controversial sociologists of the late twentieth century, in their well known work on the Whermacht, did not give a definition, but used phrases such as “degree of stability” and ability “to avoid social disintegration.”²³ More recent work by A. V. Carron, a sport psychologist, defined cohesion as “the tendency of a group to stick together and remain united in the pursuit of its goals.”²⁴ While the most recent work in this vein defines it as “a cognition about the group that exists in the minds of individual group members.”²⁵ Clearly there are many definitions of cohesion: for this study the above definitions will be combined and cohesion will be defined as ‘the tendency of a group to stick together and remain united in the pursuit of its goals, because of a cognition about the group that exists in the minds of individual group members.’ It is important that cohesion be defined, so that parameters for measuring it can be developed.

²¹ Claude Levi-Strauss, French Social Anthropologist, (1908 -).

²² Guy L Siebold, “The Evolution of the Measurement of Cohesion,” *Military Psychology* 11 no. 1 (1999): p5.

²³ E A Shils and M Janowitz, “Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II,” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 12 (1948): 280-315.

²⁴ A V Carron, “Cohesiveness in Sport Groups: Interpretation and Considerations,” *Journal of Sport Psychology* 4, (1982).

²⁵ A V Carron and K S Spink, “The Group Size-cohesion Relationship in Minimal Groups,”

In order to determine whether a group is cohesive using the above definition, it must be established whether it “sticks together.” Traditionally cohesion was expressed as “the total field of forces which act on members to remain in the group. These forces may depend on the attractiveness or unattractiveness of either the prestige of the group, members of the group, or the activities in which the group engages.”²⁶ This view has subsequently been refined by W. N. Widmeyer, L. R. Brawley and A. V. Carron, in their study of cohesion and the effectiveness of sport teams, to embrace four aspects: Group Integration – Task, Group Integration - Social, Individual Attraction to Group – Task and Individual Attraction to Group – Social.²⁷ To summarise this construct therefore, cohesion has two facets, the group integration and the individual attraction, which can be measured in two separate spheres of social and task cohesion.

The definition of operational effectiveness is clearer cut. Both British and US doctrine agree that there are three components to fighting power: the physical component, the moral component and what the British call the conceptual and Americans the informational component.²⁸ Strength in all three components is expected to confer operational effectiveness. Since cohesion is a moral factor, this monograph is concerned exclusively with the moral component.

Measurement of operational effectiveness is rather less straightforward, since in the absence of field combat it is nearly impossible to determine the combat effectiveness of a force. As a result, it was necessary to develop a surrogate measure of fighting power based on a measurable variable. The measure chosen was the degree to which officers perceive that their army employs mission command effectively. This measure was chosen because Mission

Small Group Research 26 (1995): 86-105.

²⁶ Sally A Carless and Caroline de Paola, “The Measurement of Cohesion in Work Teams,” *Small Group Research* 31, no. 1 (Feb 2000): 71.

²⁷ W N Widmeyer, L R Brawley and A V Carron, *The Measurement of Cohesion in Sport Teams: The Group Environment Questionnaire*, (London: 1985).

²⁸ United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, *Design for British Military Operations, The British Military Doctrine*, (London: HMSO, 1996), 4-3.

Command is a central pillar of British doctrine; without mission command a force's fighting power is believed to be significantly reduced. Mission command relies on five principles, which are unity of effort, decentralisation, trust, mutual understanding, and timely and effective decision-making.²⁹ These principles also all relate to cohesion, since greater cohesion will tend to enhance each of these measures within any group.

Measuring the variables requires a scale of measurement; unfortunately, there are no generally accepted scales of combat effectiveness or cohesion. It was therefore necessary to conduct a comparative study of the US Army. The obvious candidate for comparison was the British Army, since it was the comparator for the author's initial observations. The similarity of doctrine between the two armies was expected to neutralise the influence of the conceptual component, while the qualitative similarity in physical capability neutralised the influence of the physical component in determining what differences there were in the moral component. The significant difference in quantitative physical capability of the US and British Armies may play a part in shaping attitudes toward the moral domain of warfare for each army, but does not form part of this study.

In order to carry out a comparative study a questionnaire was determined to be the most efficient and accurate means of gathering the necessary data. This appears to be the first time that such a study, explicitly attempting to link the cohesion of officers with operational effectiveness, has been undertaken. Previous studies have focused on small-group cohesion and battlefield cohesion, but none appear to have addressed the value of a close-knit and socially cohesive officer corps, with a view to seizing the opportunities presented by "transformation." The intent was to test both the junior and senior elements of the US and UK Staff Colleges.³⁰ This was largely for convenience and in expectation of a reasonable response, which would be unlikely

²⁹ United Kingdom Ministry of Defence. Army Doctrine Publication, Volume 2, *Command*. (London: HMSO, 1995), 2-4.

³⁰ Sadly, it proved impossible to collect data from the junior element of the UK Staff College, which has curtailed some of the potential value of this research.

from busy field units. The design of the questionnaire was crucial and in its final form, it had four parts. Part one covered biographical data on each respondent. Part two was concerned with measurement of cohesion. Part three dealt with mission command and part four covered opinions about improving cohesion, which is covered at the end of this chapter. A copy of the questionnaire is at Appendix 5.

The biographical details gathered included education, social class, prior military connections, military accommodation choice, service with females and homosexuals, religion and politics. The purpose of these data was to determine whether there was any fundamental difference in the social composition of each army which could account for any observed difference in cohesion or combat effectiveness.

The questions to measure cohesion were grouped in four parts. The first questions were aimed at establishing a measure of individual attraction to the group socially. These questions concerned patterns and frequency of socialising with other military officers. The next block concerned group social integration and concerned frequency of attendance and opportunity to attend exclusively military social events, particularly at an officers' mess or club. Block three covered group task integration and was based around doctrinal procedures and techniques, on the principle that a well integrated group would have smoothly functioning standard operating procedures. The final group was aimed at determining the individual attraction to the task which was done by assessing how much respondents had enjoyed their past job, were enjoying their current job and expected to enjoy their future job.

The questions measuring combat effectiveness were based on the five principles of mission command. Thus, the first question baldly asked if the respondent thought his army practised mission command. The next three questions aimed at establishing a measure of unity of effort by examining use of main effort and commander's intent. The next two questions aimed at establishing a measure of the degree of decentralisation, using confidence of superiors in their subordinate's decision-making ability as the measure. Trust was measured by asking whether

respondents had been allowed to learn from their mistakes and felt trusted. Finally, mutual understanding was measured by examining understanding of role and approach to problems. It did not appear possible to measure timely and effective decision-making. All of these criteria were drawn from ADP2 *Command*.³¹

The format used for the questionnaire was to offer five response options on a scale from (a) strongly supporting the statement to (e) strongly disagreeing with it, with a neutral central position (c). In measuring frequency of attendance at social events, a scale from hardly ever to weekly was used. In general terms the greater the proportion of respondents giving an (a) response the more cohesive and the more operationally effective an army would be.

The final part of the questionnaire concerned the opinions of officers about the factors affecting cohesion and operational effectiveness. The threats to cohesion are manifold; primary amongst them is a tendency on the part of individuals toward isolation. This tendency has been closely studied by Dr Robert D Putnam, Professor of Public Policy at Harvard University, in his book *Bowling Alone*,³² a study of American society in the late twentieth century. In it, Putnam cites evidence that "the breakdown of community" and "selfishness" were "serious" or "extremely serious" problems in America.³³ He goes on to attribute this breakdown of community, or lack of cohesion, to a number of factors including suburban sprawl, the advent of mass telecommunications media and most importantly in his opinion, generation changes. His argument is that each of these factors has made it easier for individuals to live a satisfying life without interaction with other people: television replaces conversation, suburbanisation reduces the community spirit of city blocks or townships, while generation changes undermine the

³¹ United Kingdom Ministry of Defence. Army Doctrine Publication, Volume 2, *Command*. (London: HMSO, 1995), 2-4 – 2-9.

³² Robert D Putnam, *Bowling Alone*, (New York: Simon and Schuster Publishing, 2000).

³³ Ibid., 25.

perceived necessity for human interaction.³⁴ Since an army is drawn from the society it protects, and assuming Putnam's arguments are valid, many of these factors may affect the officers of the US Army and their families, tending to make them more inclined to shun company than previously. The difficulty is that such a trend is anathema to a successful fighting force. A successful army trains together and as is argued in this paper, should live together to enhance their cohesion. If as Dr Putnam suggests, future officers are even more likely to shun company it behoves both the US and British Armies to consider now, what measures might be taken to counter this tendency in order to sustain their fighting power.

Another significant factor was identified by E. A. Shils and M. Janowitz in their study of the Wehrmacht in World War II.³⁵ They too identified isolation, but included family ties as an equally major influence on weakening military primary group solidarity. The reasoning being that if a soldier had the welfare of a family and children to consider he was less likely to risk his life for his military comrades, single soldiers by contrast had fewer responsibilities and were therefore more effective members of the small group or squad.

A more recently introduced disintegrating factor has been the argument over the presence of women in the front line and declared homosexuals in the army. The arguments for and against these issues are complex and do not form part of this study. In the current context, it is sufficient to note that they are issues affecting cohesion.

Many of the factors that enhance cohesion have long been recognised by armies and include the use of uniforms, flags and local regimental names to engender a sense of belonging. Allied to these measures is the provision of a ready-made social meeting area for officers and enlisted men in the form of messes or clubs. The presence of these in the British system is regarded as key to the maintenance of cohesion and morale. In the US this is not the case and the

³⁴ Putnam's argument is that many children do not see the social activities of their parents as being enjoyable, developing their own alternatives. Unfortunately many of the modern alternatives do not involve social interaction.

club system, along with much of the history and tradition of the army has been allowed to fade away. The reasons for this neglect are not clear, but appear to be the result of several factors: money saving measures imposed by Congress in 1978, changes in US society, a bias against alcohol and tobacco products³⁶ and most importantly sixty years of relative peace that have allowed many lessons about cohesion, learnt under fire, to be forgotten.

The savings enforced by Congress removed 14,000 personnel employed in non-appropriated fund activities (ie morale and welfare activities) and effectively withdrew public financial support for morale and welfare activities; as a result clubs had to rely on membership income to survive.³⁷ Clubs relying on a military population that deploys on operations or exercises for up to nine months a year cannot survive unsubsidised. Combined with the effect of working spouses (requiring officers to take more responsibility for the care of children and therefore be at home not at the club) and the climate of alcohol and tobacco intolerance, the club system was unable to compete with establishments that had more liberal controls and were drawing on a wider market.

More active ways of encouraging cohesion include building a common understanding of doctrine through education and a mutual understanding of abilities through field training, team sports and adventurous activities. Based on the author's experience, discussions with colleagues and the issues noted above, the fourth section of the questionnaire was constructed to find out which topics were regarded as most influential in the minds of the officers responding. In general, each integrating or disintegrating factor was stated followed by a range of statements claiming that the factor was very important in building cohesion through to very adverse to building cohesion. Respondents were asked to indicate with which statement they agreed most. There were eighteen questions in this section.

³⁵ E A Shils and M Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 12 (1948).

³⁶ Clay K Culver Captain USAF, "O Clubs – Tradition or Contradiction ?" *Airpower Journal* 6 no. 4 (1992): 46-60.

In summary, the research focused on establishing a measure of cohesion using social and task parameters defined in personal and group terms and on establishing a measure of operational effectiveness using the components of mission command. The final component was to discover those issues considered by officers to be most important in building cohesion. This was all set in context by a number of demographic questions. The results are discussed in the next chapter.

³⁷ Ibid.

CHAPTER 3 – RESULTS

“You can use all the quantitative data you can get, but you still have to distrust it and use your own intelligence and judgment.”³⁸

Response to the survey from the United States Army Command and General Staff

College (USA CGSC) and Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3) was encouraging with 131 and 133 respondents respectively. The UK response was less complete. Whilst nearly half of the army officers at the Joint Services Command and Staff College (JSCSC) responded, this amounted to only forty-five responses. Unfortunately due to administrative difficulties, it proved impossible to issue the questionnaire to the Army Junior Division (AJD). The three groups of responses are all sufficiently large to draw statistically valid conclusions.

The first level of analysis was simply to plot the percentages of each group responding in each answer category. This produced the bar charts in figures one to fifty of Appendix 1, from which it is possible to assess the differences and similarities between the population samples. In particular one fact is clear: there is little difference in opinion over operational effectiveness between CGSC and JSCSC.

To analyse the data further and determine whether the differences are statistically valid each response was allocated a numerical value using the five-point scale of responses described in the methodology. Answers strongly supportive of cohesion or strongly indicating high operational effectiveness were allocated five points, while those at the opposite end of the scale were allocated one. The median score was three. A Kruskal Wallis test was then run using these figures. The Kruskal Wallis test is a non-parametric test which calculates the relative order in which the populations ranked their responses to each question, compares the responses and then

³⁸ Alvin Toffler, US author (1928 -).

determines whether the difference in responses are statistically different or fall within acceptable degrees of error.³⁹

In this case the questions that elicited significantly different responses are listed in tables one to four of Appendix 4 and show a significant difference in nearly all aspects of cohesion; only in the “group integration – task” do CGSC and JSCSC show similar responses. In particular it is interesting to note that while two thirds of the JSCSC population socialise in a group of three or more at least once a week, less than half of the CGSC population does (Fig 14). Similarly while ninety one percent of the JSCSC population expect to attend a formal military social event at least once every three months only twenty six percent of the CGSC population have the same expectation (Fig 13). It is also noteworthy that while forty percent of CGSC officers hardly ever socialise with the men under their command, only ten percent of British officers show the same behaviour (Fig 15). Finally and most tellingly, while nearly three quarters of JSCSC officers enjoyed their work as junior officers enormously, only half of the CGSC officers had the same experience (Fig 20). From this there may be grounds to conclude that the British Army’s officers are slightly more cohesive than those of the US, since this study shows that there is a statistically valid difference in three of the four aspects of cohesion.

The CAS3 responses confirm this possibility while highlighting some interesting features. Although most of the social cohesion responses are very similar to the CGSC officers, one difference is that the CAS3 officers socialise almost as frequently as JSCSC officers (Fig 14). In spite of this, twenty percent of them feel that there is insufficient opportunity for socialising with fellow officers outside work (Fig 16). Perhaps the most telling difference is that only thirty percent of CAS3 officers enormously enjoyed their work as junior officers (Fig 20). At the same time twenty nine percent of CAS3 officers are unsure about or dislike their current (not staff college) work, compared with only eleven percent of British officers (Fig 21). Additionally

³⁹ Acceptable degree of error is defined as having a probability of being accurate of greater than ninety-five percent.

CAS3 officers appear to be less convinced of their "group integration - task" than CGSC officers, since in response to all of the questions related to this aspect of cohesion a greater percentage of CAS3 responses were less positive than those from CGSC (Figs 17-19). It would appear that CAS3 officers are generally less cohesive in all four aspects of cohesion as defined by Widmeyer et al. Taking both CGSC and CAS3 responses it would seem that the British Army officer corps is somewhat more cohesive than that of the US Army.

The responses relating to operational effectiveness are not as clearly differentiated. Only one question of the ten showed a statistically valid difference - seventy six percent of CGSC officers feel they have been allowed to learn from their mistakes, while only fifty eight percent of JSCSC officers had the same opinion (Fig 29). For the remaining operational effectiveness questions the Kruskal-Wallis test shows that there is no statistically relevant difference (Figs 23-32). From the JSCSC – CGSC comparison therefore, it might be concluded that there is only marginal difference between the operational effectiveness of the two armies.

The CAS3 responses however suggest a slightly different picture. In most of the questions the CAS3 responses were marginally less positive than those of JSCSC and in four cases the differences were statistically relevant (Figs 23-32). In particular, while ninety five percent of JSCSC officers felt they had the confidence of their superior commanders, only seventy percent of CAS3 officers had the same expectation (Fig 27). For ninety-nine percent of JSCSC officers their commanders' expressed clear main efforts in the field, this is true for only eighty percent of CAS3 officers (Fig 26). Similar differences were also observed over understanding of roles and development of common perception of approach to problems (Figs 31 and 32). In light of these results, it might be concluded that, although there is little to choose between the two armies, the British Army is likely to be slightly more operationally effective than the US Army given the current understanding of operational effectiveness.

These findings show that there is a distinct difference in levels of cohesion in the three populations examined, with JSCSC showing the strongest overall cohesion and CAS3 the

weakest. CGSC and JSCSC officers have broadly similar expectations of operational effectiveness, but CAS3 officers have a significantly lower expectation. The conclusion from these results must be that cohesion does have an effect on operational effectiveness, but it may not be as direct an effect as expected. For example, the data reveal a close correlation between cohesion and work enjoyment. In itself, this may have no impact on operational effectiveness, but there may be an indirect effect, since officers who do not enjoy their work leave the army, taking with them the investment made in their training and thereby reducing the army's operational effectiveness. This is borne out by the results of the questionnaire. At CAS3 sixteen percent of officers are unsure about or dislike their work, at CGSC only two percent are in this category (Fig 21). Whilst this may be the result of significantly different experiences between the two populations, it is more likely that the unhappy officers simply left the army or did not get selected for CGSC. Even if the officers do not leave they are likely have an adverse effect on the morale of their troops, thereby diminishing the operational effectiveness of the army.

A final level of analysis was conducted by separating the responses from combat arm officers (armour, infantry and aviation), combat support officers (artillery, air defence, engineers and signals) and combat service support officers (remaining branches). Unfortunately the CAS3 population that was queried was composed largely of CSS officers; an accident of the schools' advanced course timetables, so their overall responses are skewed toward the CSS viewpoint and few variations were detectable. These data were then subjected to the same analysis as the group data for each school. Some interesting variations were found between these branch specific responses and the general responses, notably in the British Army. In general the combat arms showed higher levels of cohesion in all three populations (JSCSC, CGSC and CAS3), but the British combat arms officers were shown to be significantly more cohesive than the British CSS officers. For example sixty-five percent of JSCSC as a whole used the mess or club at least several times monthly (Fig 12). For combat arm officers, the figure is nearly ninety percent (Fig 51). Similarly, while nearly fifty percent of the overall JSCSC population socialise mostly with

other military (Fig 11), the figure for CSS officers is only thirty percent (Fig 65). At CGSC too there is a difference: of the overall population only fifty percent enormously enjoyed their work as a junior officer (Fig 20), while nearly seventy percent of combat arm officers did so (Fig 52). Conversely only thirty percent of CSS officers at CGSC enjoyed their work as junior officers (Fig 67).

The difference in levels of cohesion is reflected in expectations of operational effectiveness. While only forty five percent of the total JSCSC population felt the British Army practiced mission command most of the time, the percentage of combat arms officers holding this opinion was fifty five (Fig 54). Likewise while only fifty five percent of the total JSCSC population felt the main effort was always defined in the field nearly eighty percent of combat arms officers felt it was (Fig 56). A similar but less pronounced effect was evident in the CGSC responses (Figs 54 and 56). Thus just within the officers of the JSCSC there is a direct link, based on branch, between level of cohesion and expectation of operational effectiveness.

There is, therefore a difference in cohesion between the populations studied and such a difference may have an impact on operational effectiveness. The demographic and opinion sections of the questionnaire may throw some light on the reasons for this difference. These opinions are explored in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 4 - ANALYSIS

“The thing in any organisation is the creation of a soul.”⁴⁰

Demographically the populations of JSCSC, CGSC and CAS3 are remarkably similar. All three groups had seventy percent of officers holding a degree before joining the army (Fig 3), and all three were substantially middle class (Fig 4) and politically conservative (Fig 5). There was slightly more evidence of sons following fathers into the service in the UK than in America, with fifty percent of JSCSC officers having fathers who had served against about thirty percent of US officers (Fig 5). The only significant differences were in accommodation choice (which is discussed elsewhere) and religion, where nearly sixty percent of US officers rate it as fundamental or important to their lives compared to only about fifteen percent of JSCSC officers (Fig 9). It might be imagined that a more religious officer corps would be more cohesive, the fellowship of man and love for mankind being central tenets in nearly all religions. This is not necessarily the case for a number of reasons. US society has a very diverse collection of religions and adherence to one religion can tend to make individuals less likely to associate with adherents of other religions (or even sects of the same religion). Also, merely adhering to the forms of worship and professing to follow a particular religion does not necessarily make individuals any more likely to trust or understand their fellow officers, even if by some chance they do all profess the same religion. Religious teaching may however, affect some opinions relating to social behaviour, tolerance of impropriety and acceptance of alcohol.

⁴⁰ General George S Patton, *The Patton Papers*, ed Martin Blumenson, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972-74).

The fundamental difference between the responses of JSCSC students and US students was exposed by asking what factor they considered most important in sustaining operational effectiveness. Nearly half of JSCSC students viewed morale as the most important factor while only seven percent of CGSC and sixteen percent of CAS3 students felt the same way. The US preference was for leadership, cited by sixty four percent of CGSC officers and fifty five percent of CAS3 officers, with only thirty five percent of JSCSC officers selecting it. Notably discipline and equipment which claimed respectively about eleven and four percent of the US vote were not selected by any JSCSC officers. Doctrine and training was the choice of about ten percent of officers in all three populations (Fig 37).

It is possible therefore, that US officers place much greater emphasis on leadership and by extension their personal role as leaders, while British officers prefer to stress the well being (or morale) of the whole, thereby playing down their own role. The difference may be that JSCSC officers see leadership as only a part of the means of sustaining morale. As Field Marshall Montgomery put it, "Certain factors may be described as essential conditions without which high morale cannot exist. These four basic factors are: leadership, discipline, comradeship and self-respect." and later "Morale is, in the first place, based on leadership. Good morale is impossible without good leaders."⁴¹ A further example of this approach is the difference between US and UK principles of war. The UK includes maintenance of morale, while the US does not. Given this disparity some of the subsequent observations are more easily understood.

One obvious difference between JSCSC and the US colleges can be found in the frequency of socialisation of the officers in each population. JSCSC officers were the most social, with sixty six percent of officers socialising in a group of three or more, at least once a week, CAS3 officers followed with sixty three percent and CGSC officers trailed with only forty five percent (Fig 14). Age differences between the populations may explain this, but the age charts indicate that the average JSCSC student is thirty-three, CGSC student thirty-five and CAS3

student only thirty-one (Fig 1, even this figure is distorted by the presence of a few much older officers since the bulk of the CAS3 officers are in their late twenties). Given these ages it would be expected that CAS3 officers would socialise much more frequently than JSCSC officers, but this is not the case.

A partial explanation of this situation may lie in the lack of opportunity for socialising in a military environment, demonstrated by the significantly lower use of officers' mess and club facilities by US officers. Clearly part of the cause of this is the relative lack of officers' clubs on US posts. There are only a total of thirty officers' clubs and 155 community or consolidated clubs to serve the entire US Army.⁴² This compares with over 200 officers' messes to serve the much smaller British Army.⁴³ Some of the reasons for this difference were explored in an earlier chapter but it is important to note that in spite of the pressures reducing club attendance, sixty six percent of CGSC officers and sixty percent of CAS3 officers feel that a mess or officers' club is important in building cohesion (Fig 43).

One of the main arguments put forward to account for the decline in club attendance is the advent of the "new dad," the father who is more involved in the upbringing of his children than was traditionally the case.⁴⁴ This argument was confirmed in this study, since of 107 JSCSC army officers in the 2001 – 2002 class, eighty-seven (eighty-one percent) are married and sixty-two (fifty-eight percent) have children. This compares with 873 CGSC officers, of whom 770 (eighty-seven percent) are married and 568 (seventy-six percent) have children.⁴⁵ These figures confirm that the CGSC population includes a greater percentage of parents and that this responsibility may restrict their ability to socialise. When the CAS3 situation is analysed

⁴¹ Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, *Serve to Lead – An Anthology* (London: HMSO, [undated]): 11.

⁴² TROL Army Factsheet. Available from:
http://trol.redstone.army.mil/mwr/business_programs/army_clubs/fact.html; Internet; accessed 25 July 2001.

⁴³ British Army website. Available from:
<http://www.army.mod.uk/unitsandorgs/subsections/regiments.htm>; Internet; accessed 19 January 2002.

⁴⁴ Clay K Culver Captain USAF, "O Clubs – Tradition or Contradiction ?" *Airpower Journal* 6 no. 4 (1992): 46-60.

⁴⁵ Data supplied by CGSC Directorate of Student Affairs, January 2002.

however, it appears that of 519 officers, only 370 (seventy one percent) were married.⁴⁶ Again, it would be expected that CAS3 officers would socialise more frequently than JSCSC officers, but they do not.

The “new dad” phenomenon is also apparent in the UK and a solution to it has been to encourage spouses, girl or boyfriends and other guests into the messes. In many UK messes there is at least one night a week when families are invited to dinner, and lunch is always open to families. In this way, officers’ families are integrated into the life of the unit, thereby sustaining its cohesion while allowing families to be together and partially addressing the issue of uniting the families when the soldiers are operationally deployed.

This response assumes though, that time is available to spend an hour at lunch or to gather for dinner in the evening. Here may lie the root of the issue. It is part of US military culture to arrive at work very early, to work straight through the day and leave late in the evening. This approach is visible even at CGSC, an environment in which there is little pressure to meet deadlines. Students go to the gymnasium at 0600 and start lessons at 0800, working straight through lunch in order to be able to leave the college by 1500 (early by comparison with work hours in the field army). Part of the reason for this is that there is nowhere to have lunch except for a burger bar in the basement.⁴⁷

A common aspect of work in the British Army is coffee or tea breaks, which occur at specified times of day and last for up to thirty minutes. Whilst some may view these breaks as counter productive and time wasting, they are invaluable to developing cohesion and incidentally provide a fixed time each day when even the most elusive officers may be found. Potentially then, one of the most cohesion-corrosive attitudes is the US aversion to taking formal breaks for

⁴⁶ Data supplied by the office of the Director of CAS3, January 2002.

⁴⁷ This is not a new phenomenon, Air Marshall Sir Arthur ‘Bomber’ Harris on his first visit to the Pentagon commented: “A strictly utilitarian and obviously efficient hot-dog stand occupies most of the front hall. I left during the lunch hour, as colonels elbowed for counter room and access to the communal mustard pot, hamburger in hand. They get only half an hour for lunch...” Quoted in the Peterborough column of the *London Daily Telegraph*, 7 September 2001.

coffee and lunch. Arguably the demand for such breaks exists, if the quantity of coffee consumed daily in class at CGSC is any measure.⁴⁸ Put another way the British Army makes time for socialising over meals and breaks devoting resources to sustaining a working environment that is enjoyable. This approach clearly pays dividends since over seventy percent of JSCSC officers claim to have enormously enjoyed their work as junior officers, while only fifty percent of CGSC and thirty percent of CAS3 officers make the same claim (Fig 20).

An issue that links with this is choice of accommodation. JSCSC officers overwhelmingly selected to live in military accommodation (over ninety percent of officers), while about thirty percent of CGSC and nearly forty percent of CAS3 officers prefer off-post housing (Fig 6). This difference again tends to reduce cohesion, since a unit that has all its families living together will find it much easier to look after them when the soldiers are deployed. In addition, following Professor Putnam's theories, outlined in *Bowling Alone*,⁴⁹ families living together will tend to build up a community spirit which is not possible when they are dispersed. Part of the reason some families may wish to live off-post is the variable quality of on-post housing. This can only be resolved by the investment of public money to bring the housing up to a uniformly high standard. To eliminate government provided accommodation and expect officers to live in rented or purchased, off-post housing is unreasonable, since officers are asked to change appointments at least every twenty-four months. There are few civilian occupations that demand the same mobility without providing significant compensation.

Aside from the issues of cohesion are the issues of operational effectiveness. In this area there is little to choose between the officers of the three colleges except in how much they have felt trusted by their commander. For CGSC and JSCSC students ninety five percent felt they had their commander's confidence, while only seventy percent of CAS3 felt the same way (Fig 27).

⁴⁸ The CGSC 'Daily Grind' coffee bar in January 2002 sold approximately seventy-five gallons of coffee weekly according to the operator.

⁴⁹ Robert D Putnam, *Bowling Alone*, (New York: Simon and Schuster Publishing, 2000).

Ninety two percent of JSCSC students felt trusted by their commander, while only eighty five percent of CGSC and seventy five percent of CAS3 felt likewise (Fig 30). From this it would seem that US students identify a difference between being trusted by someone and having their confidence, which is a difficult distinction to define.⁵⁰ Overall though, US students feel less trusted by their commanders. This finding is corroborated by the ATLD report, which states, “There is diminishing direct contact between seniors and subordinates.... This diminishing contact does not promote cohesion and inhibits trust” and “Top-down training directives and strategies ...lead to a perception that micromanagement is pervasive.”⁵¹ The issue therefore is to determine ways in which senior officers can be encouraged to allow their subordinates more latitude.

Trust is a fundamental issue in building cohesion and one of the principal ways of developing trust is through social interaction. It is interesting therefore to see that while forty five percent of CGSC officers and thirty five percent of CAS3 officers hardly ever associate with the soldiers under their command socially, only eleven percent of JSCSC officers follow the same pattern (Fig 15). Similarly, while ninety five percent of JSCSC students feel that all ranks parties are important for cohesion, only seventy six percent of CGSC and CAS3 feel the same way (Fig 44). This disparity indicates a relative lack of interest on the part of US officers in the lives of the soldiers under their command, which cannot promote cohesion and trust within a unit. Here the issue is to determine ways in which junior officers can be encouraged to develop a greater understanding of issues outside their army affecting the soldiers under their command.

Asking officers what age they thought was ideal for marriage revealed one interesting facet of this question. When the questionnaire was presented there was no “Whenever you like”

⁵⁰ “Confidence is a relationship of trust or intimacy”. Webster’s Online Dictionary, available from: <http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary>; Internet; accessed 19 January 2002.

⁵¹ United States Department of the Army. *Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study Report to the Army*, available from: <http://www.army.mil/features/ATLD/ATLD.htm>; Internet; accessed 9 November 2001, 2.

option. Quite a few officers however felt sufficiently strongly about the issue that they chose to add this extra category themselves. Thirty percent of JSCSC officers, twenty five percent of CGSC officers and ten percent of CAS3 officers fell into this category (Fig 39). Broken down by branch an interesting pattern emerges. While the relative percentages remain almost unchanged for CGSC and CAS3, only twelve percent of combat arms officers at JSCSC felt strongly enough to comment, while sixty percent of the CSS officers felt obliged to do so (Figs 62 and 74). The significance of this is that it appears that JSCSC CSS officers do not consider there is a 'right age' for marriage, in view of the demands of their profession. JSCSC combat arms officers on the other hand appear to feel that there is a 'right age' and may be considering the demands of their profession since they largely selected between twenty-seven and thirty years as the ideal. It is no accident that at this age British combat arms officers are least likely to be in command of troops, since they are too old for troop or platoon command and too young for squadron or company command. There is therefore no competition for their attention between their soldiers and their husband or wife. If the same thinking is true in America, it may explain the relative lack of interest displayed by US officers in their soldiers. Even for those officers at CGSC and CAS3 that stated a preference it was for marriage between twenty five and twenty seven years of age, which is just when US officers are at their busiest commanding troops. This attitude chimes well with Shils and Janowitz's theory explained in chapter two, that family ties are an impediment to the development of strong unit cohesion.⁵²

Fundamentally this is an issue of "Are you an officer first, or are you a husband and father first?" The dilemma is most dramatically exposed in the following scenario: An officer (in this case male) is at war overseas and is about to lead an important military raid; his troops and superiors are relying on him to do his job. Unfortunately, he has just received news that his

⁵² In the British Army there is a saying "Subalterns are not married, Captains may marry, Majors will marry and Colonels are married." This stems from the view that a young officer cannot have two mistresses – the army and his wife – and have any peace of mind. He will be a less effective officer if he does and should therefore delay marriage until his troop commanding days are over.

daughter has been badly injured in a car crash and may not live. Should he return to his daughter or continue with his military mission ? There is no easy answer, but from a military perspective and in a truly cohesive army the officer probably ought to stay with his soldiers, more than one of whom may die under his command. It is for consideration that the US Army might delay company command until officers reach field rank as is currently done in the British Army and the US special forces. Although this is only one factor relating to the issue of field rank company command, it offers two main advantages; it allows a natural break in an officer's career when the family can come first and it ensures that companies are commanded by officers who have had the opportunity to develop a broader experience base than currently. The disadvantages lie in the necessary restructuring of officer education, the disjunction of some officers' careers and the overall disruption in the officer personnel system.

If family ties, normally seen as desirable components of a well rounded officer's life, adversely affect cohesion, how much more damaging might currently less accepted notions be ? In particular, how might the three controversial issues of drugs, homosexuals serving openly and the presence of women in the front line affect the development of trust in a unit ? There is general agreement among all officers that the use of drugs by soldiers for recreational purposes is unadvisable, although CGSC and CAS3 officers take a more robust approach with ninety five percent of officers saying it is unacceptable as opposed to only eighty percent of JSCSC officers (Fig 35). Notably the CSS officers at JSCSC are most tolerant, with only fifty percent saying recreational drug use is unacceptable (Fig 73). The US view may be a reaction to the bad experiences of the US Army with drugs in combat, notably in Vietnam, a situation which the British Army has not yet had to face. The difference between CSS and combat arms officers at JSCSC may indicate however, that officers from combat arms, who command soldiers under fire, are less tolerant of habits that potentially endanger other soldiers than those from CSS units, who generally work in a less threatening environment.

Homosexuality elicits similar responses. Roughly thirty percent of US officers thought that the presence of known homosexuals would be very adverse to unit operational effectiveness, while only two percent of JSCSC officers held the same view (Fig 33). Generally combat arms officers are less tolerant of homosexuality than CSS officers in all three populations, but again the JSCSC CSS population are the most tolerant with sixty percent of officers believing that the presence of homosexuals will have a neutral effect (Fig 71). Since nearly three quarters of all officers claim to have worked with a known homosexual (Fig 8), this disparity cannot be put down to lack of experience of working with homosexuals. What is certain is that in the British Army homosexuals may serve legally and openly since 1999. There does not appear to have been any change in disciplinary incidents relating to homosexuality since then and this may have influenced the opinions of the JSCSC officers.⁵³ It is interesting to note though that in the combat arms where officers and soldiers rely on each other much more closely than in the CSS elements, there is much less tolerance for homosexuality.

The same pattern is repeated over the issue of women in the front line with nearly forty percent of CGSC students claiming it will have a very adverse effect, as opposed to only twenty percent of JSCSC students, although noticeably the CAS3 officers are much more tolerant in this respect (Fig 34). When branch affiliation is taken into account the difference becomes even more stark. Again the combat arms officers are most intolerant, but US combat arms officer hold the extreme with almost fifty percent claiming the presence of women will be very adverse to operational effectiveness, while only forty percent of JSCSC combat arms officers make the same claim. Interestingly CAS3 officers are the most tolerant group as a whole, with only twenty percent feeling the presence of women will have a very adverse effect. When branch affiliation is included the JSCSC CSS element are again most tolerant, with forty percent claiming the effect will be neutral and none claiming it will be very adverse (Figs 61 and 72). Experience of working

⁵³ Brig K H Cima, Chief of Staff to the Adjutant General of the British Army, presentation to the British Army Staff Conference, Washington DC, 27 September 2001.

with women may contribute to the difference since nearly all JSCSC officers had experience of working with women, while only eighty percent of US officers could claim the same good fortune, and the officers who had not worked with women were predominantly combat arms officers (Fig 8). Arguably therefore, prejudice is at work here since those officers who have worked with women see less difficulty with their integration than those who have not. It is worth noting that although there were very few women in the sample populations, many of them (forty-four percent at CAS3 and sixty six percent at CGSC) felt that the presence of women in the front line would adversely affect operational effectiveness.⁵⁴ It is also worth noting that it is those officers serving in those parts of the army most likely to be exposed directly to enemy fire that are most concerned about the adverse effect of the inclusion of women.⁵⁵

The reasons for this relative intolerance in the US Army are unclear, but may be evidence of the relative importance of religion in officers' lives, at least in relation to the use of drugs and homosexuality. Political orientation may also play a part in forming officer's opinions and it is worth noting that in general, combat arms officers are more likely to be politically conservative than CSS officers. Seventy percent of all CGSC officers are conservative, while only fifty five percent of CSS officers at CGSC would so describe themselves. For JSCSC officers the effect is even more marked; overall the JSCSC population is sixty percent conservative, while of the CSS officers only twenty percent are conservative and of the combat arms officers eighty percent are conservative (Figs 10 and 64). This political affiliation may relate to officers' general world views, thus in Britain a Conservative would be likely to hold conservative opinions and therefore not be likely to welcome women in the combat arms.

In the opinion of many officers (ninety percent of all three colleges) part of coping with issues of cohesion and overcoming some of the obstacles to it, is allowing officers to remain in

⁵⁴ There were a total of thirty-nine women in the study – twenty three at CAS3, fifteen at CGSC and only one at JSCSC who felt the presence of women would be neutral.

one job for more than eighteen months (Fig 50). An issue also identified by Colonel S. L. A.

Marshall in *Men Against Fire* when, referring to the US Army, he says:

We have never had any continuity of policy which is based upon the simple idea that esprit de corps depends upon comradeship and our changing policies too frequently reflect an obliviousness to the factors which compose the moral strength of the fighting forces.

One approach, which may help with these issues, is a regimental system, which is viewed by eighty nine percent of JSCSC students as important to developing cohesion. Interestingly, roughly seventy percent of both CGSC and CAS3 officers hold the same view (Fig 42). Developing such a system for the US Army may therefore be beneficial. Although the US Army has a vestigial regimental system the question is to determine what form a meaningful and useful system might take in America. The British model regimental system is based on regional affiliation, in the same way that US Civil War Regiments were regionally raised and modern Army National Guard units continue to be organised.

At the heart of this issue lies the difference between British and US regiments. In America, the regiment has retained its original meaning of a group of three battalions or squadrons on the battlefield. In the UK, the meaning has changed. On the battlefield it refers only to armoured, artillery, engineer, signal or logistics regiments, which consist of three squadrons but each squadron is only the equivalent of a US company. Domestically the regiment still means a grouping of infantry battalions (rarely more than two), but this grouping has no meaning on the battlefield. The only parts of the British Army that still have a true regimental system are the Household Cavalry, Royal Armoured Corps and Infantry, where once a soldier or officer joins a regiment or battalion, he stays with it for the duration of his service.⁵⁵ For all the

⁵⁵ For an analysis of the case for and against the inclusion of women in the front line see: Rogers John G S, "Gender Integration in the New Zealand Infantry" (MMAS thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, 2001).

⁵⁶ Officers join the General Staff on promotion to Colonel and cease to be official members of their regiment or battalion. They still retain unofficial links with it however, by wearing the uniform of the regiment (less cap badge) for example. Soldiers may transfer between regiments or battalions in special

other arms and services, while they are organised into regiments or battalions and an effort is made to sustain stability, there is no guarantee of continuity of service in any particular regiment. One of the reasons for this was that as the British Army reduced in size, combat support and service support arms became more specialised; as they did so there were not sufficient of them to sustain regional affiliations.

Comparatively, the US Army is sufficiently large to allow regional affiliation for all arms and services. Regional affiliation need not necessarily guarantee any likelihood of service in that region; in the same way that being an Irish Guard does not guarantee service in Ireland. Ideally, however the new organisation might consist of a number of domestic regiments (in the US style) consisting of three battalions. Of the three battalions, the aim would be to have one serving in the home area at any time. The requirement for operational brigade headquarters along current lines would still exist.

While this system has many benefits, it also has several drawbacks. It would become necessary to move entire battalions around in order to ensure that no one battalion spends too long in any one place. In the UK, this system is referred to as the 'Arms Plot'. There would also be considerable disruption in reorganising to achieve this new structure. The benefits of such a regimental system are that officers and soldiers, over a number of years, get to know the men alongside whom they may fight. An article by a US officer from the US Infantry Journal, quoted in *Serve to Lead* (the primer on officership at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst) makes this point well. The author is commenting on another author's description of the defence of Calais in 1940:

It rather appears that this staunch courage was inspired by obedience to the very fine regimental tradition. Six or eight men...would fight as if defending the Holy Sepulchre because the corporal in command has told them, 'This's where Mr So-and-So said we were to go' And Mr So-and-So has spoken with the voice of the regiment" ... It is expressing it in too little terms to say (he) spoke with the voice of the regiment... There can be only one explanation of how the

circumstances, but this will usually be at their own request or in the event that their promotion may be delayed by staying in their original regiment or battalion.

regiment and its fine traditions inspired these men to the extreme point... it was because the men who died... had previously discovered the characters of the men who led them.⁵⁷

Officers therefore have the advantage that when commanding the battalion, the Commanding Officer will have known his Command Sergeant Major as a junior non-commissioned officer (and vice versa). One effect of this is to make officers more personally involved in the development of their subordinates, as they are likely to be relying on them again in a later post. As Colonel S. L. A. Marshall put it "...all other things being equal, the tactical unity of men working together in combat will be in the ratio of their knowledge and sympathetic understanding of each other."⁵⁸ In addition, the three battalions allow scope for limited cross posting between battalions in order to maintain promotion prospects and cope with urgent personnel requirements. Perhaps the most significant advantage is that in war time, formed units of replacements can be trained and equipped at the home station, imbued with the Regimental esprit de corps, and despatched as a unit to the theatre of conflict. This relatively simple expedient will form a connection between the officers of the units already in battle and the new arrivals, that may be invaluable in combat. The 'new boy' will be 'one of us' as opposed to a faceless replacement. The major disadvantage is that there is a period of significant turbulence when a battalion arms plots in the brigade.

Clearly such a change would require significant alteration of the US Army, but considering that seventy percent of the officer corps believe a regimental system is important (Fig 42) and when viewed in light of some of the comments in the Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) Officer Study, such a change might not be unreasonable. Particularly relevant ATLDP comments include that "the Army expects more commitment... than it currently provides." "Junior leaders are not receiving adequate leader development

⁵⁷ Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, *Serve to Lead – An Anthology* (London: HMSO, [undated]), 18.

⁵⁸ S L A Marshall, *Men Against Fire*, (Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter Smith Publishing, 1978), 150.

experiences" and "There is diminishing direct contact between seniors and subordinates."⁵⁹ A regimental system which focuses the attention of officers at all levels on a relatively limited number of subordinates over a long period of time may help to address these issues. A by-product of such a system could be a forum for the sustenance of the history and tradition of the US Army, a factor deemed by ninety percent of both CGSC and CAS3 officers to be important in sustaining combat effectiveness (Fig 38).

Another means of sustaining history and tradition, while addressing many of the other issues raised, might be a revitalisation of aspects of the officers' clubs. In particular, provision of a place in which officers want to gather, with their families, for coffee, lunch and occasionally dinner, could significantly enhance unit cohesion. Notably only ten percent of US officers (both CGSC and CAS3) chose to occupy Bachelor Officers' Quarters (BOQ) before they got married, while seventy five percent of JSCSC officers chose to live in the mess (Fig 7). This suggests that British officers perceive a significant advantage to communal living, not seen by US officers. A perception is current that while the food and service in a Club may be comparable with civilian establishments, the behaviour code in the club, allied with the risk of adverse comment on alcohol consumption,⁶⁰ makes it less attractive to officers.⁶¹

A comment in an article in Army Times makes the point very clearly "Reinvigorate the on-post club system for enlisted soldiers, non-commissioned officers and officers. The clubs provided an atmosphere for informal team building and sheer fun that was readily accessible, safe and affordable. *A truly cohesive Army can flourish only when soldiers share the good times as*

⁵⁹ United States Department of the Army, *Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study Report to the Army*, available from: <http://www.army.mil/features/ATLD/ATLD.htm>; Internet; accessed 9 November 2001. 2.

⁶⁰ In the survey for this monograph while sixty percent of CGSC officers felt that consumption of alcohol at military social events was acceptable and ten percent felt it should be encouraged, a sizeable fifteen percent felt it should be discouraged and fifteen percent were neutral. The danger is when one of the discouraging fifteen percent is in command.

⁶¹ Clay K Culver Captain USAF, "O Clubs – Tradition or Contradiction ?" *Airpower Journal* 6 no. 4 (1992): 46-60.

well as the hardships. Create a place for war fighters to mingle comfortably with their peers⁶² (emphasis supplied). The difficulty is to make the club a desirable place to go. A large part of this relies on leadership, not necessarily by senior officers, but by peer leaders.

In some British Regiments there is a figure called the senior subaltern, who is one of the senior living-in officers⁶³ below field rank. He is selected by the Commanding Officer to be the peer leader of the younger members of the mess. His selection is very important, as a bully could be disastrous and an officer without charisma a figurehead only. He could be described as ‘the leader of the pack.’ Through the influence of this officer, younger, newly arrived officers are introduced to the ways of the regiment, in particular the importance of participating in mess life.⁶⁴ If this is to work however, senior leaders must ensure that the club is well run and must make use of it themselves on suitable occasions. There are two ways that such investment may be possible in the US Army. The first is to persuade Congress to fund the maintenance of an essential part of the fabric of the military, but given that Congress only withdrew the funding relatively recently, this is unlikely to succeed. The other option may be more feasible. Individual battalions, regiments and brigades could establish a non-publicly funded club, perhaps using existing facilities. Such ventures would be contingent on enlisting the financial backing of every officer in the unit or formation and require significant leadership by the commander to drive the project forward, but given the degree of support for officers’ clubs revealed by this study, such an effort may prove rewarding.⁶⁵

⁶² B T Gericke and R Choppa, “To fix the Army, consider working on its soldiers first,” *Army Times* 60 no. 22, 27 December 1999, 54.

⁶³ ie living in the mess.

⁶⁴ A good example of this working was in the 2nd Battalion of the Parachute Regiment, then commanded by Lt Col Paul Gibson. On arriving to take command of the regiment, he found the mess to be unused and unpopular. He identified the ‘leader of the pack’, convinced him that the mess was essential to the morale of the regiment, personally attended dinner once a week and lunch two or three times weekly. By the end of his tour officers did not want to move out of the mess to make room for new arrivals. Source – author’s personal discussion with Col Gibson at Gettysburg Pennsylvania, 20th April 2001.

⁶⁵ An excellent example of this kind of self-help is the development, during 1993, of a Squadron Mess in the 1/1 Cavalry in Budingen, Germany. This club was run by the officers of the squadron for their own benefit and using entirely their own finances, in the building that had previously been the MWR operated Officers’ Club. It provided a limited bar facility and a comfortable gathering place. The important thing

What is important is not so much the “officers’ club” (a term which carries many expectations) as the development of a place where officers and their families feel comfortable relaxing and socialising, a place where they would go to do so in preference to local non-military establishments and a place which meets their needs. Whilst this study has compared US and British Army systems, a worthwhile comparison may be possible with the US Air Force, Navy and Marines who currently place more emphasis on their club system and appear to have somewhat greater social cohesion among the officers than does the army. Such a study may reveal how these services sustain social cohesion while drawing from the same society as the US Army.

While an “O Club” substitute may do much to enhance social cohesion, another issue is the development of task cohesion. This might be done by emphasising the importance of adventurous training, which is seen by over ninety percent of all officers, both US and British, as important to developing cohesion (Fig 40). At the expense of formal military training time and budget, a system could be developed under which junior officers (lieutenants) arrange adventurous training trips for their platoons. The trip must be the sole responsibility of the organising officer, who must raise the necessary cash, gain all the necessary clearance,⁶⁶ organise transport and write any subsequent after action reports. The benefits of such activity are many fold. The officer develops his own leadership skills and self confidence, the soldiers get some variety in their training and all participants can observe each other under conditions of stress and thereby learn to trust each other. Most importantly, the commander develops a feel for the ability of the officer to work without supervision and can thereby begin to assess the degree of trust he may repose in him. Finally such trips are generally very good for unit morale.

was that people preferred to use this club rather than go elsewhere. Source: author’s interview with Major Daryle Hernandez, (S-1 of the 1/1 Cav 1992 – 1994), conducted 16 February 2002.

⁶⁶ The British Army has a system of Adventure Training Approval to ensure that there is a sufficient ratio of instructors to students for hazardous activities, that the proposed challenge is feasible with the expertise available and that the necessary political clearance has been given for foreign travel.

It has been noted that the morale of a unit was emphasised by the JSCSC officers at the expense of their personal role. This approach may pay dividends in enhancing troop morale, but it may be counterproductive in terms of producing well-educated officers. In particular, it is noticeable that US officers deem a firm grounding in tactics and doctrine to be significantly more important than JSCSC officers, with forty three percent of CGSC, forty four percent of CAS3 and only twenty percent of JSCSC rating it as very important in building cohesion (Fig 48). This difference may be due to the staff systems used in each army. In the British Army the commander drives the production of orders and plans, with the staff doing the legwork. In the US the process is much more driven by the staff. An examination of the relevant doctrine publications bears this out.⁶⁷ Under such circumstances, it is important for all US officers to have a similar understanding of doctrine, since they must be able to work on solutions with little or no guidance initially. In the British Army this is not the case since the commander derives the solution and it is then up to the staff to develop it. It may be advisable for the British Army to consider promoting the relevance of doctrine to its staff officers in order to impress upon them the significant benefits in terms of mutual understanding that come with a unified doctrine.

The most significant issue for the British Army appears to be that there is a sharp contrast between the views of its combat arms officers and those of its CSS officers. In general, CSS officers appear to be more tolerant of homosexuals, women in the front line and drugs, they are also less cohesive and expect to be less operationally effective than their fellow combat arm officers. Part of the explanation for this may lie in the differing political outlook between CSS and combat arm officers, since CSS officers are generally more liberal. The answer may however lie in the organisational and social structure of the British Army. Only the combat arms retain a true regimental system, and with it a true mess system, which is used by all officers. The CSS

⁶⁷ Comparing ADP Command and FM 101-5 it is clear that whilst commanders in both systems are responsible for making decisions. The British staff generally work on ideas developed by the commander, while the US staff develop their own ideas and await a decision from the commander.

elements of the British Army whilst organised in battalions and companies, do not benefit from the long-term regimental stability of the combat arms and perhaps as a result are less cohesive.

It appears therefore, that the British Army has two distinct formats. The closely cohesive and operationally effective combat arms that have developed mutual trust, both vertically and horizontally and the less cohesive and less effective CSS elements. The US Army however has a reasonably homogenous blend between combat arms and CSS elements. Arguably, what is needed is for the US combat arms to adopt some of the methods developed in the British Army and outlined above, in order to enhance the cohesion of its fighting troops and prepare for the ambiguous and empty battlefield of the future. British CSS elements, on the other hand, might do well to emulate their US counterparts.

Whilst all of these issues and measures deal with potential changes in the relatively near future, there remains Dr Putnam's issue of generational change, which will have long-term effects. He argues that the officers of future generations will be even more likely than they are now to shun society and 'go it alone'. Such a trend can only be damaging to the effectiveness of both the US and British Armies. Addressing this change poses a significant challenge and perhaps the only solution is to attempt to influence tomorrow's officers while they are still today's children. Both the US and Britain have a history of military high schools, but in both countries relatively few officers attended military schools between age thirteen and eighteen (four percent at CGSC and CAS3, nine percent at JSCSC). In both countries many of the military schools have long been so more in name than fact, since none has regular military staff. Whilst the concept of militaristic schools may be repugnant to some, and may seem to divorce the military even further from society, they may prove to be the only means of sustaining a cohesive and effective military into the latter part of this century.

CHAPTER 5 – RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

“Note the army organisations and tactical formations on paper are always determined from the mechanical point of view, neglecting the essential coefficient, that of morale. They are almost always wrong.”⁶⁸

Recommendations

The principal recommendation of this paper is that the critical value of cohesion for enhancing operational effectiveness should be taken into account in the transformation of the US Army and indeed in any subsequent changes to the British Army. To this end, the desirability of sustaining the single arm unit organisation of the current US and British Armies should be reviewed. Consideration should be given either to permanently task-organised, all arms battalions and brigades or to a system whereby rapid reorganisation can be undertaken without detriment to operational effectiveness. Such a system will require significantly enhanced cohesion amongst the officer corps to overcome the potential friction of reorganisation.

To facilitate this concept the US Army might consider conducting a study into the feasibility of reorganising its combat arms into domestic regiments of three battalions each with territorial affiliations. At any time it would be desirable to have one battalion serving in or near its home location, one serving somewhere else on the mainland USA with a rapid overseas deployment capability and one overseas. The disadvantages of this reorganisation would be the immediate, significant disruption caused by reorganisation and the long-term necessity to develop an “arms plot” or scheme to rotate entire battalions around formations and commands. The benefits would be to provide a stable military ‘home’ for officers and soldiers, thereby encouraging mutual trust, loyalty and cohesion, through repeated common involvement in

⁶⁸ Lt Gen Antoine-Henri Baron de Jomini, *The Art of War*, 1838, tr Mendell and Craighill, (Philadelphia: J B Lippincott and Co, 1862; Westport Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1971).

training, operations and social activity and identification with a particular location and heritage.

In war, the advantage is replacement units with some understanding of esprit de corps and a fledgling feeling of belonging. The transformation process, when upheaval and disruption are inevitable, affords an excellent opportunity to institute this measure with the minimum of extra distraction.

The secondary recommendation is that the US Army conduct a study into ways of revitalising social interaction among officers (and incidentally NCOs and enlisted men) either by means of public money, or through a concerted leadership effort to replace social cohesion at the heart of each battalion. Revitalised Officers' Clubs may be one way of doing this but should not be the only means considered; simply providing decent restaurant facilities might be a good start. There are several advantages in doing this. Firstly, it would provide a forum in which senior officers can sustain their contact with junior officers in a relaxed environment. Secondly, it would provide an impetus to reintroduce meal breaks and thereby encourage social interaction between the officers. Finally, it would provide a mechanism for getting officers' spouses involved with the unit, thereby enhancing another element of unit cohesion. There are no obvious disadvantages to this proposal, save that it will require significant leadership effort. Whilst money may appear to be an issue, this is merely a matter of leadership priorities. If cohesion is as fundamental to operational effectiveness as this paper suggests, this investment, which is admittedly significant, will pay handsome dividends.

A third recommendation is that company command should mainly be the role of field grade officers (majors). This will serve two purposes; it will allow officers a natural break in their careers when many want to marry and concentrate on their family⁶⁹. It will also allow officers to develop a greater professional understanding before assuming command of an

⁶⁹ Since most US officers advocate marriage aged twenty-five and thirty (Fig 39) and most command companies aged over thirty, there should be little change in the proportion of married company commanders. They will however have had time to develop their marriage without the pressure of troop command.

organisation with combat power equivalent to a current battalion. The disadvantages are all relatively short term, relating to disruption of the current personnel management systems, officer education and the potential disjunction of the careers of a number of officers. These drawbacks could however be mitigated by carrying out the necessary changes during transformation, when there will be significant turbulence anyway.

A fourth recommendation is that greater emphasis be placed upon the development of self-reliance through the medium of adventure training exercises. The advantage is that young officers will learn to act independently, without supervision, that senior officers will learn to trust junior officers so to do and that soldiers will learn to trust their junior officers. The disadvantage is that formal training may have to be curtailed. The judgement is whether learning battle drills under supervision is as valuable as learning independent command skills.

A fifth recommendation is that a study be conducted to determine the desirability and feasibility of establishing publicly funded military secondary schools, supported by the active army and dedicated to training potential future officers. The advantage of this is to socialise cadets before they are influenced by current social trends, thereby guaranteeing a supply of suitable young officers. The disadvantage is that the military retreats further from society and begins to adhere to a code irrelevant in the society that it defends.

A recommendation for the UK is that either the British Army reinforce the regimental system for its CSS elements or that it conduct a study of the US Army CSS elements to determine what sustains their cohesion, in the absence of a regimental system. There is a danger that without taking one of these actions, the British CSS elements will fall too far behind the British combat arms and there will be a risk of a two-tier army with attendant dangers in terms of future operational effectiveness. Further it is recommended that the importance of understanding and correctly applying doctrine be stressed to British officers, who appear to regard it as an irritant rather than an assistant.

Finally, it is recommended that a full and thorough study of the influences affecting the social cohesion of the US Army be undertaken, since this relatively incomplete study has revealed a wealth of concerns, which might profitably be addressed. In particular a comparative study with the US Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force might be beneficial.

Conclusion.


Cohesion is a critical non-tangible force multiplier. A cohesive army can successfully employ mission command, thereby increasing the tempo of its operations and its likely operational effectiveness. Nurturing and developing cohesion is an expensive, slow and leadership intensive task, but one that pays handsome dividends in war. It is essential that the groundwork for such development be laid now when the US Army is transforming itself. No matter how good the equipment, how total the information superiority or how brilliant the doctrine, if the officers expected to plan and carry out operations do not know and trust each other and the troops they command, battlefield execution becomes significantly harder.

The US and British Armies have developed systems suitable to their historic mode of operation. The British Army, used to colonial and small-scale operations developed a professional, volunteer officer corps with a system stressing the social cohesion of the combat arms and designed to foster that cohesion. Task cohesion, while a less important element of the British way, nonetheless played and still plays a significant part. The British Army, however, has failed to sustain this cohesion in its combat service support elements, which appear to be rather less cohesive than they might be. The US Army, historically a large-scale mobilisation force with a citizen-soldier mentality in the officer corps, has a system that relies almost exclusively on task cohesion and has tended to ignore social cohesion. This system has provided an almost uniform level of cohesion throughout the US Army, but it is at a relatively low level. These two systems have worked well for each army in the past.


The thesis question though, is will the US system work in the transformed army ? The conclusion of this thesis is that it will not if it does not change, since the crucial element of trust is missing. The current system inhibits trust and reduces the opportunities for developing mutual understanding, both requirements critical to operating on the future battlefield. If the US Army is to make the most of its already considerable abilities, it would do well to look at the cohesion of its officer corps.

APPENDIX 1 – Analysis Graphs (Entire Populations)


Demography




Branch (Fig 2)




Higher Education (Fig 3)




Social Class (Fig 4)




Paternal Service (Fig 5)




Married Accommodation Choice (Fig 6)




Accommodation Choice (Fig 7)




Work Experience with Women and Homosexuals (Fig 8)




Religion (Fig 9)




Politics (Fig 10)




Cohesion




Mess or Club Use (Fig 12)




Formal Military Event Attendance (Fig 13)




Frequency of Socialisation (Fig 14)




Socialisation with Soldiers (Fig 15)




Opportunity to Socialise (Fig 16)




Clarity and Coherence of Doctrine (Fig 17)




Understanding Of Own Doctrine (Fig 18)




SOP/TTP Uniformity Below Brigade Level (Fig 19)




Degree of Enjoyment of Work as Junior Officer (Fig 20)




Degree of Enjoyment of Current Work (Fig 21)




Expectation of Enjoyment of Future Jobs (Fig 22)




Operational Effectiveness




Understanding of Intention of Chain of Command (Fig 24)




Allocation of Main Effort in Barracks (Fig 25)




Allocation of Main Effort in the Field (Fig 26)




**Feeling Of Having Commander's Confidence
(Fig 27)**




Expectations on Guidance (Fig 28)




Frequency of Being Allowed to Learn From Mistakes (Fig 29)




Feeling of Being Trusted by Senior Commander (Fig 30)



Development of Common Approach with Commander (Fig 32)




Having Same Understanding of Role as Commander (Fig 31)




Opinion


Expected Effect of Homosexuals in Military Units (Fig 33)




Expected Effect of Women In Front Line Roles (Fig 34)




Drug Use (Fig 35)




Consumption of Alcohol at Military Events (Fig 36)




Most Important Factor in Combat Effectiveness (Fig 37)





Role of History Tradition etc (Fig 38)




Suitable Marriage Age (Fig 39)




Role of Adventure Training (Fig 40)




Role of Team Sports (Fig 41)




Role of Regimental System (Fig 42)




Role of Messes or O Clubs (Fig 43)




Role of All Ranks Parties (Fig 44)




Role of Bn or Coy PT (Fig 45)




Role of Compulsory Church Parades (Fig 46)




Role of Training (Fig 47)




Role of Doctrine (Fig 48)



Role of Discipline (Fig 49)






Role of Stability (Fig 50)




Cohesion

APPENDIX 2 – Analysis Graphs (Combat Arms Only)




Operational Effectiveness


Practice of Mission Command - Combat Arms Only (Fig 54)




Understanding of Intention of Chain of Command - Combat Arms Only (Fig 55)





Allocation of Main Effort in the Field - Combat Arms Only (Fig 56)




Feeling of Having Commander's Confidence - Combat Arms Only (Fig 57)






Opinion


**Expected Effect of Homosexuals in Military Units -
Combat Arms Only (Fig 60)**




**Expected Effect of Women in Front Line Roles -
Combat Arms Only (Fig 61)**



**Suitable Marriage Age - Combat Arms Only
(Fig 62)**




**Role Of Regimental System - Combat Arms Only
(Fig 63)**




APPENDIX 3 – Analysis Graphs (CSS Units Only)


Cohesion




Socialisation Preference - CSS Only (Fig 65)



Mess or Club Use - CSS Only (Fig 66)




Degree of Enjoyment of Work as Junior Officer - CSS Only (Fig 67)




Operational Effectiveness


Practice of Mission Command - CSS Only (Fig 68)







Feeling of Commander's Confidence - CSS Only (Fig 70)



Expectations on Guidance - CSS Only (Fig 69)



Opinion



APPENDIX 4 – Kruskal Wallis Analysis Results

TABLE ONE

Comparison of JSCSC and CGSC Cohesion and Operational Effectiveness

Question	Staff College	N	Very Positive	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Very Negative	Mean Rank
Q2 How often do you expect your social activities to involve a mess or officers' club ?	JSCSC	45	0%	4%	64%	29%	2%	126.64
	CGSC	131	0%	5%	13%	42%	40%	75.40
Q3 How often do you expect to attend a formal military social event ?	JSCSC	45	0%	22%	69%	9%	0%	129.96
	CGSC	131	0%	8%	18%	66%	7%	74.26
Q4 How often do you socialise in a group (of 3 or more) ?	JSCSC	45	20%	47%	33%	0%	0%	104.97
	CGSC	131	15%	30%	45%	8%	3%	82.84
Q6 Do you feel that you have sufficient opportunity to socialise with fellow officers outside work hours ?	JSCSC	45	56%	40%	0%	4%	0%	113.40
	CGSC	131	20%	66%	5%	8%	0%	79.95
Q11 Did you enjoy your work as a junior officer ?	JSCSC	45	73%	27%	0%	0%	0%	103.43
	CGSC	131	51%	47%	2%	0%	0%	83.37
Q20 Have you been allowed to learn from your mistakes ?	CGSC	131	26%	50%	24%	1%	0%	94.53
	JSCSC	45	11%	47%	31%	11%	0%	70.96

TABLE TWO**Comparison of JSCSC and CAS3 Cohesion and Operational Effectiveness**

Question	Staff College	N	Very Positive	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Very Negative	Mean Rank
Q2 How often do you expect your social activities to involve a mess or officers' club ?	JSCSC	45	0%	4%	64%	29%	2%	122.40
	CAS3	133	0%	5%	20%	44%	31%	78.37
Q3 How often do you expect to attend a formal military social event ?	JSCSC	45	0%	22%	69%	9%	0%	133.63
	CAS3	133	0%	8%	16%	72%	5%	74.57
Q6 Do you feel that you have sufficient opportunity to socialise with fellow officers outside work hours ?	JSCSC	45	56%	40%	0%	4%	0%	123.08
	CAS3	133	14%	56%	9%	20%	2%	78.14
Q9 Do you feel that your army has a well expressed, coherent doctrine ?	JSCSC	45	60%	29%	11%	0%	0%	103.62
	CAS3	133	44%	29%	15%	5%	6%	84.72
Q11 Did you enjoy your work as a junior officer ?	JSCSC	45	73%	27%	0%	0%	0%	121.57
	CAS3	133	29%	55%	11%	3%	2%	78.65
Q12 Do you currently enjoy your work ?	JSCSC	45	27%	62%	7%	4%	0%	103.43
	CAS3	133	19%	52%	14%	10%	5%	84.79
Q17 In the field have your superior commanders made clear to you where the main effort lies ?	JSCSC	45	56%	33%	11%	0%	0%	105.17
	CAS3	133	34%	47%	15%	4%	1%	84.20
Q18 Have you felt that your superior commanders have confidence in your decisions ?	JSCSC	45	31%	64%	4%	0%	0%	103.10
	CAS3	133	29%	41%	22%	7%	2%	84.90
Q22 Have you and your superior commanders had the same understanding of your role ?	JSCSC	45	27%	64%	9%	0%	0%	101.62
	CAS3	133	23%	50%	21%	5%	2%	85.40
Q23 Have you and your superior commanders developed a common perception of how to approach military problems ?	JSCSC	45	20%	60%	20%	0%	0%	102.00
	CAS3	133	17%	44%	29%	8%	2%	85.27

TABLE 3
Comparison of JSCSC and CAS3 Opinion

Question	Group	N	Very Important	Important	Neutral	Not Important	Irrelevant	Mean Rank
Q36 How will the presence of women in front line units affect the operational effectiveness of women in front line units affect the operational effectiveness of Drug use by soldiers in their own time ?	JSCSC	45	4.4%	0.0%	22.2%	53.3%	20.0%	76.37
Q37 How important is the history, tradition, uniforms and ceremonial of the Army ?	CAS3	133	7.5%	15.8%	24.1%	32.3%	20.3%	93.94
Q38 How important is an education in doctrine and procedures ?	JSCSC	45	0.0%	0.0%	2.2%	17.8%	80.0%	98.20
Q39 What is the most important factor in sustaining combat effectiveness ?	JSCSC	45	0.0%	46.7%	11.1%	0.0%	37.8%	4.4% 104.82
	CAS3	133	5.3%	15.8%	10.5%	10.5%	54.9%	5.3% 84.32
			Morale	Equipment	Discipline	Doctrine	Training	Leadership
								None of these

TABLE 3
Comparison of JSCSC and CAS3 Opinion

Question	Group	N	Very Important	Important	Neutral	Not Important	Irrelevant	Mean Rank
Q36 How will the presence of women in front line units affect the operational effectiveness of the unit?	JSCSC	45	4.4%	0.0%	22.2%	53.3%	20.0%	76.37
Q37 How will the presence of women in front line units affect the operational effectiveness of Drug use by soldiers in their own time ?	CAS3	133	7.5%	15.8%	24.1%	32.3%	20.3%	93.94
Q38 How important is the history, tradition, uniforms and ceremonial of the Army ?	JSCSC	45	0.0%	0.0%	2.2%	17.8%	80.0%	98.20
Q39 What is the most important factor in sustaining combat effectiveness ?	CAS3	133	0.0%	0.0%	1.5%	5.3%	93.2%	86.56
Q40 How important is an education in doctrine and procedures ?	JSCSC	45	24.4%	66.7%	6.7%	2.2%	0.0%	76.50
Q41 How important is an Officers' Mess or 'O' Club ?	CAS3	133	45.9%	45.1%	8.3%	0.8%	0.0%	93.90
Q42 How important is a regimental system ?	JSCSC	45	28.9%	60.0%	8.9%	2.2%	0.0%	102.00
Q43 How important is an Officers' Mess or 'O' Club ?	CAS3	133	20.3%	52.6%	23.3%	3.8%	0.0%	85.27
Q44 How important is an Officers' Mess or 'O' Club ?	JSCSC	45	42.2%	44.4%	11.1%	2.2%	0.0%	111.51
Q45 How important are Company or Squadron 'smokers' (parties) ?	CAS3	133	20.3%	41.4%	34.6%	3.8%	0.0%	82.05
Q46 How important are Company or Squadron 'smokers' (parties) ?	JSCSC	45	31.1%	64.4%	4.4%	0.0%	0.0%	107.92
Q47 How important is Battalion or Company PT ?	CAS3	133	16.5%	59.4%	18.0%	2.3%	3.8%	83.27
Q48 How important are Church Parades ?	JSCSC	45	46.7%	40.0%	8.9%	4.4%	0.0%	108.12
Q49 How important is an education in doctrine and procedures ?	CAS3	133	29.3%	32.3%	28.6%	9.0%	0.8%	83.20
Q50 How important is an education in doctrine and procedures ?	JSCSC	45	20.0%	66.7%	13.3%	0.0%	0.0%	76.03
	CAS3	133	44.4%	41.4%	13.5%	0.8%	0.0%	94.06

Leadership	None of these
Discipline	
Doctrine	
Morale	
Equipment	
Training	

Q39 What is the most important factor in sustaining combat effectiveness ?	JSCSC	45	0.0%	46.7%	11.1%	0.0%	37.8%	4.4%	104.82
	CAS3	133	5.3%	15.8%	10.5%	10.5%	54.9%	5.3%	84.32

TABLE 4 Comparison of JSCSC and CGSC Opinion

Question	Group	N	Very Important	Important	Neutral	Not Important	Irrelevant	Mean Rank
Q35B How would the presence of acknowledged homosexuals in a unit affect the morale and effectiveness of the unit?	JSCSC	45	2.2%	2.2%	37.8%	55.6%	2.2%	114.03
Q36 How acceptable is the presence of homosexuals in a unit affect the morale and effectiveness of the unit?	CGSC	131	4.5%	2.3%	13.5%	42.1%	36.1%	79.73
Q37 How acceptable is the presence of homosexuals in their own time ?	JSCSC	45	0.0%	0.0%	2.2%	17.8%	80.0%	99.16
Q38 How acceptable is the consumption of alcohol at military events ?	CGSC	131	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.8%	94.7%	84.84
Q39 How acceptable is the consumption of alcohol at military events ?	JSCSC	45	8.9%	73.3%	17.8%	0.0%	0.0%	99.80
Q40 How acceptable is the consumption of alcohol at military events ?	CGSC	131	5.3%	63.2%	15.0%	12.0%	3.0%	84.62
Q42 How important is participation in Adventurous Training ?	JSCSC	45	48.9%	44.4%	6.7%	0.0%	0.0%	100.81
Q43 How important is participation in Adventurous Training ?	CGSC	131	30.1%	58.6%	9.8%	0.0%	0.0%	84.27
Q44 How important is a regimental system ?	JSCSC	45	28.9%	60.0%	8.9%	2.2%	0.0%	102.34
Q45 How important is an Officers' Mess or 'O' Club ?	CGSC	131	18.0%	52.6%	26.3%	0.8%	0.8%	83.74
Q46 How important are Company or Squadron 'smokers' (parties) ?	JSCSC	45	42.2%	44.4%	11.1%	2.2%	0.0%	107.81
Q47 How important are Church Parades ?	CGSC	131	20.3%	45.9%	30.8%	0.8%	0.8%	81.87
Q48 How important are Church Parades ?	JSCSC	45	31.1%	64.4%	4.4%	0.0%	0.0%	103.47
Q49 How important is an education in doctrine and procedures ?	CGSC	131	20.3%	55.6%	20.3%	1.5%	0.8%	83.36
Q50 How important is firm discipline ?	JSCSC	45	2.2%	22.2%	62.2%	11.1%	2.2%	104.96
Q51 How important is firm discipline ?	CGSC	131	3.8%	13.5%	44.4%	19.5%	17.3%	82.85

Q39 What is the most important factor in sustaining combat effectiveness?		None of these	Leadership	Discipline	Morale	Equipment	Training/Doctrine	Discipline	Leadership	None of these
JSCSC	45	0.0%	46.7%	11.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	37.8%	4.4%	111.14
CGSC	131	3.0%	7.5%	9.0%	11.3%	63.9%	3.0%	63.9%	3.0%	80.72

APPENDIX 5 - Questionnaire

MILITARY COHESION QUESTIONNAIRE
FOR A MONOGRAPH TO BE WRITTEN BY MAJOR NICK BERCHEM KRH
AS PART OF THE MASTER OF MILITARY ARTS AND SCIENCE DEGREE PROGRAMME AT THE
UNITED STATES ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES (SAMS)

Dear fellow officer,

The US Army is in the process of transforming from a heavy structure to the objective force, and the British have similar aspirations. The officers of both armies are clearly critical in achieving this process. Success will depend partly on the cohesion of the officers as a group. **The aim of this survey is to try to find out what it is that makes for better cohesion and to suggest ways of sustaining and improving the current cohesion of both officer corps.**

This questionnaire should take **no longer than 15 minutes** to complete, but please give your answers some thought. Thank you for your help, I am very grateful for your time.

You should glance over the administrative points below before answering the questions.

Principal Purpose: This survey is designed to provide raw data for a SAMS Monograph, to be submitted in part completion of the requirements for an MMAS degree course.

Routine Use: The survey is anonymous. The results will be used solely by the author to support his monograph. Collated data will be presented in appendices to the monograph, but individual responses will be destroyed.

Disclosure: Providing information on this survey is voluntary, some of the questions are of a very personal nature. **If you feel at all uneasy about answering any question, do not give a response and move on to the next question.** All information provided will be treated as confidential.

Please provide the following basic data on this sheet:

Branch, Regiment or Corps.....

Age in years only.....

Sex.....

M / F

Current Staff College Course.....

US CGSOC

US CAS3

UK JSCSC

UK JDSC

BACKGROUND DATA

1. Prior to joining the army did you have a university or college degree ?
a. Yes.
b. No.
2. Did you attend a military school between the ages of 13-18:
a. Yes.
b. No
3. Did you subsequently attend:
a. The United States Military Academy West Point.
b. The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst.
c. Officer Cadet School.
d. A Reserve Officer Training Corps.
e. None of the above.
4. Is your family background:
a. Upper Class.
b. Upper Middle Class.
c. Middle Class.
d. Lower Middle Class.
e. Working Class.
5. Did your father:
a. Serve as an Army Officer.
b. Serve as soldier.
c. Serve as both officer and soldier.
d. Serve in any of the other armed services.
e. Have no military connection at all.
6. If offered military accommodation do you normally chose to use it:
a. Yes.
b. No.
7. As an unmarried junior officer did you:
a. Live in a mess or BOQ.
b. Live in your own house.
c. Rent civilian accommodation.
d. A combination of the above.
e. I was married before becoming an army officer.
8. Have you ever worked with female soldiers ?
a. Yes.
b. No.
c. I am female.
9. Have you ever, to your knowledge, worked with someone known to be homosexual ?
a. Yes.
b. No.
10. Is faith or religion:
a. Fundamental to your life.
b. Important in your life.
c. Part of your life
d. Unimportant in your life.
e. Not part of your life.
11. Would you describe yourself as:
a. Politically conservative (Republican or Conservative).
a. Politically liberal. (Democratic or Labour).
b. Politically uncommitted.
c. A supporter of another political viewpoint (Green, Communist, etc)
d. Apolitical.

COHESION DATA

12. When socialising are you most likely to:
- a. Socialise with military friends nearly all the time.
 - b. Socialise with military friends most of the time.
 - c. Socialise equally with military and civilian friends.
 - d. Socialise with civilian friends most of the time.
 - e. Socialise with civilian friends nearly all the time.
13. Do you expect your social activities to involve a mess or officers' club:
- a. More than once a week.
 - b. Weekly.
 - c. Several times a month.
 - d. Once or twice a year.
 - e. Hardly ever.
14. Do you expect to attend a formal military social event:
- a. Weekly.
 - b. Monthly.
 - c. Once every three months
 - d. Once or twice annually.
 - e. Hardly ever.
15. Do you socialise in a group (of 3 or more):
- a. More than once a week.
 - b. Weekly
 - c. Several times a month.
 - d. Once or twice a year.
 - e. Hardly ever.
16. Do you socialise (ie spend time in a social environment, not necessarily off post or out of barracks) with the soldiers (not officers) under your command:
- a. Weekly.
 - b. Several times a month.
 - c. About once a month.
 - d. Once or twice a year.
 - e. Hardly ever.
17. Do you feel that you have sufficient opportunity to socialise with fellow officers outside work hours ?
- a. Plenty of opportunity.
 - b. Enough opportunity.
 - c. Do not know.
 - d. Insufficient opportunity.
 - e. No opportunity at all.
18. Do you feel that officers of your acquaintance take advantage of the opportunity if it exists or would take the opportunity if it were offered ?
- a. Am confident they would.
 - b. I think they probably would.
 - c. Do not know.
 - d. I think they probably would not.
 - e. Am confident they would not.
19. Do you understand the doctrine of your army ?
- a. Very well.
 - b. Well.
 - c. Do not know.
 - d. A bit.
 - e. Not at all.
20. Do you feel your army has a well expressed, coherent doctrine ?
- a. Yes, it is clear and coherent.
 - b. It is clear but not very coherent.
 - c. It is coherent but not very clear.
 - d. No it is neither clear nor coherent.
 - e. Do not know.
21. Do you feel your army has a uniform approach to tactical procedures below Brigade level ?
- a. Yes, the SOPs (TTPs for US officers) are clear and generally used.
 - b. The SOPs (TTPs) are clear but they are rarely used.
 - c. The SOPs (TTPs) are out of date and uncoordinated so everyone has their own.
 - d. Nobody uses the same SOPs (TTPs)
 - e. Do not know.
22. Did you enjoy your work as a junior officer ?
- a. Enjoyed it enormously.
 - b. Mostly enjoyed it.
 - c. Neither enjoyed nor disliked it.
 - d. Mostly disliked it.
 - e. Hated it all.
23. Do you currently enjoy your work ?
- a. Enjoy it enormously.
 - b. Mostly enjoy it.
 - c. Neither enjoy nor dislike it.
 - d. Mostly dislike it.
 - e. Hate it all.
24. Do you expect to enjoy your appointments in the next 5 years ?
- a. Expect to enjoy them enormously.
 - b. Expect mostly to enjoy them.
 - c. Expect neither to enjoy nor dislike them.
 - d. Expect mostly to dislike them.
 - e. Expect to hate them all.

MISSION COMMAND

Mission Command is "telling subordinates what to achieve and why, rather than what to do and how".

25. In your opinion your army practices Mission Command.
- a. Nearly all the time.
 - b. Most of the time.
 - c. Sometimes.
 - d. Rarely.
 - e. Hardly ever.
26. In your normal unit or formation you have understood the intention of your chain of command :
- a. Nearly all the time.
 - b. Most of the time.
 - c. Sometimes.
 - d. Rarely.
 - e. Hardly ever.
27. In garrison your superior commanders have made clear to you where the main effort lay:
- a. Nearly all the time.
 - b. Most of the time.
 - c. Sometimes.
 - d. Rarely.
 - e. Hardly ever.
28. In the field (ie on operations or exercise) your superior commanders have made clear to you where the main effort lay:
- a. Nearly all the time.
 - b. Most of the time.
 - c. Sometimes.
 - d. Rarely.
 - e. Hardly ever.
29. You have felt that your superior commanders have confidence in your decisions:
- a. Nearly all the time.
 - b. Most of the time.
 - c. Sometimes.
 - d. Rarely.
 - e. Hardly ever.
30. You expect to be given complex missions (with completion dates) and:
- a. Be left to get on with them by yourself.
 - b. Be given plenty of latitude within some guidance.
 - c. Be given clear guidance about their completion.
 - d. Be given direction as to what has to be done by when.
 - e. Be told how to complete them.
31. You have been allowed to learn from your mistakes:
- a. Nearly all the time.
 - b. Most of the time.
 - c. Sometimes.
 - d. Rarely.
 - e. Hardly ever.
32. You have felt trusted by your superior commanders:
- a. Nearly all the time.
 - b. Most of the time.
 - c. Sometimes.
 - d. Rarely.
 - e. Hardly ever.
33. You and your superior commanders have had the same understanding of your role:
- a. Nearly all the time.
 - b. Most of the time.
 - c. Sometimes.
 - d. Rarely.
 - e. Hardly ever.
34. You and your superior commander have developed a common perception of how to approach military problems:
- a. Nearly all the time.
 - b. Most of the time.
 - c. Sometimes.
 - d. Rarely.
 - e. Hardly ever.

OPINION:

In your opinion:

35. The presence of acknowledged homosexuals in military units would affect the operational effectiveness of the unit:
- Very positively.
 - Positively.
 - Not at all.
 - Negatively.
 - Very negatively.
36. The presence of women in front line (Armour, Infantry, Artillery, Aviation, Engineers) units affects the operational effectiveness of the unit:
- Very positively.
 - Positively.
 - Not at all.
 - Negatively.
 - Very negatively..
37. Drug use by soldiers in their own time is:
- To be encouraged.
 - Acceptable.
 - Neither a good nor bad thing.
 - Unadvisable.
 - Unacceptable.
38. The consumption of alcohol at official military events is:
- To be encouraged.
 - Acceptable.
 - Neither a good nor bad thing.
 - Unadvisable.
 - Unacceptable.
39. The most important factor in sustaining combat effectiveness is:
- Good equipment (maintenance and supply).
 - Troop morale.
 - A common understanding (doctrine and training).
 - Discipline.
 - Leadership (at all levels).
 - None of the above.
40. The history, tradition, uniforms and ceremonial of the Army:
- Are very important in building cohesion.
 - Are important for building cohesion.
 - Neither build nor damage cohesion..
 - Tend to be adverse to cohesion building.
 - Are very adverse to building cohesion.
41. In your opinion officers should marry:
- Aged 21 or younger.
 - Aged 22-24.
 - Aged 25-27.
 - Aged 27-30.
 - Aged 31 or older.
42. Participation in challenging and adventurous sporting activities:
- Is very important in building cohesion.
 - Is important for building cohesion.
 - Neither builds nor damages cohesion..
 - Tends to be adverse to cohesion building.
 - Is very adverse to building cohesion.
43. Participation in team sports:
- Is very important in building cohesion.
 - Is important for building cohesion.
 - Neither builds nor damages cohesion..
 - Tends to be adverse to cohesion building.
 - Is very adverse to building cohesion.
44. A regimental system:
- Is very important in building cohesion.
 - Is important for building cohesion.
 - Neither builds nor damages cohesion..
 - Tends to be adverse to cohesion building.
 - Is very adverse to building cohesion.
45. An officers' mess or O Club:
- Is very important in building cohesion.
 - Is important for building cohesion.
 - Neither builds nor damages cohesion..
 - Tends to be adverse to cohesion building.
 - Is very adverse to building cohesion.
46. Company or Squadron 'smokers' (parties):
- Are very important in building cohesion.
 - Are important for building cohesion.
 - Neither builds nor damages cohesion..
 - Tend to be adverse to cohesion building.
 - Are very adverse to building cohesion.
47. Battalion or Company PT (Physical Training) as a group:
- Is very important in building cohesion.
 - Is important for building cohesion.
 - Helps build cohesion.
 - Tends to be adverse to cohesion building.
 - Is very adverse to building cohesion.
48. Church parades or compulsory attendance at church services (for Americans - although such measures are not currently employed in the US Army please give your opinion of the effects if they were) :
- Is very important in building cohesion.
 - Is important for building cohesion.
 - Neither builds nor damages cohesion..
 - Tends to be adverse to cohesion building.
 - Is very adverse to building cohesion.
49. Regular and realistic training:
- Is very important in building cohesion.
 - Is important for building cohesion.
 - Neither builds nor damages cohesion..
 - Tends to be adverse to cohesion building.
 - Is very adverse to building cohesion.

50. A sound education in doctrine and military procedures:

- a. Is very important in building cohesion.
- b. Is important for building cohesion.
- c. Neither builds nor damages cohesion..
- d. Tends to be adverse to cohesion building.
- e. Is very adverse to building cohesion.

51. Firm discipline:

- a. Is very important in building cohesion.
- b. Is important for building cohesion.
- c. Neither builds nor damages cohesion..
- d. Tends to be adverse to cohesion building.
- e. Is very adverse to building cohesion.

52. Allowing officers more than 18 months in one post:

- a. Is very important in building cohesion.
- b. Is important for building cohesion.
- c. Neither builds nor damages cohesion..
- d. Tends to be adverse to cohesion building.
- e. Is very adverse to building cohesion.

Please suggest, on a separate sheet, any methods of building cohesion not listed here, which you feel are particularly beneficial:

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Andreski, Stanislav. *Military Organization and Society*, 2nd Ed. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd, 1968.
- Baynes, John. *Morale, A Study of Men and Courage*. London: Cassell and Co, 1967; New York: Avery Publishing Group Inc, 1988.
- Cann, Alan. Inferential Statistics; available from
<http://www-micro.msb.le.ac.uk/110/111-19.html> Internet; accessed 10 October 2001.
- Carless, Sally A and Caroline de Paola. "The Measurement of Cohesion in Work Teams." *Small Group Research* 31 no. 1. (Feb 2000).
- Carron A V. "Cohesiveness in Sport Groups: Interpretation and Considerations." *Journal of Sport Psychology* 4, (1982).
- Carron A V and K S Spink. "The Group Size-cohesion Relationship in Minimal Groups." *Small Group Research* 26 (1995).
- Cima K H, Brigadier, Chief of Staff to the Adjutant General of the British Army, presentation to the British Army Staff Conference, Washington DC, 27 September 2001.
- Culver, Clay K, Captain USAF. "O Clubs: Tradition or Contradiction." *Airpower Journal* 6 no. 4 (Winter 1992).
- Clausewitz, Carl von. ed & trans Michael Howard and Peter Paret. *On War*. Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1984.
- Dixon, Norman. *On the Psychology of Military Incompetence*. London: Jonathan Cape Ltd, 1976; London: Pimlico, 1994.
- Dixon, Wilfrid J and Frank J Massey Jr. *Introduction to Statistical Analysis* 4th Ed. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1983.
- Gericke B T and R Choppa. "To fix the Army, consider working on its soldiers first." *Army Times* 60 no. 22. (27 December 1999).
- Hackworth, Colonel David H and Julie Sherman. *About Face, The Odyssey of an American Warrior*. New York: Touchstone Books, 1989.
- Hoffer, Eric. *The True Believer*. New York: Harper and Row, 1951.
- Holles, Robert O. *Now Thrive the Armourers, A Story of Action with the British Gloucesters in Korea (November 1950 – April 1951)*. New York: Bantam Books, 1952.
- Hubbuch, Susan M. *Writing Research Papers Across the Curriculum*, 4th Ed. Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1996.

James, Lawrence. *The Rise and Fall of the British Empire*. (London: Little, Brown and Co; New York: St Martin's Griffin, 1994).

Janowitz, Morris. *The Professional Soldier : A Social and Political Portrait*. New York: The Free Press, 1960.

Jomini, Lt Gen Antoine-Henri Baron de. *The Art of War*, 1838. tr Mendell and Craighill. Philadelphia: J B Lippincott and Co, 1862; Westport Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1971.

Karnow, Stanley. *Vietnam, A History*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1983.

Kellett, Anthony. *Combat Motivation: The Behavior of Soldiers in Battle*. Boston: Kluwer Nijhoff Publishing, 1982.

Marshall, Colonel S L A USA (Ret). *Men Against Fire, The Problem of Battle Command in Future War*. Gloucester Massachusetts: Peter Smith Publishing, 1978.

Miller, David. *Commanding Officers*. London: John Murray (Publishers) Ltd, 2001.

Montgomery, Field Marshall the Earl of Alamein, *High Command in War*, London: privately printed, 1945.

Moore, Harold G, Lt Gen USA (Ret). *We Were Soldiers Once and Young*. New York: Random House, 1992.

Moskos, Charles C and Frank R Wood. *The Military: More Than Just a Job ?* Washington DC: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988.

Patton, General George S. *The Patton Papers*. ed Martin Blumenson. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972-74.

Putnam, Robert D. *Bowling Alone*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000.

Rogers, John G S, Major Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment. "Gender Integration in the New Zealand Infantry." MMAS thesis, US Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, 2001.

Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. *Serve to Lead – An Anthology* (London: HMSO, [undated]).

Sandefur, Rebecca L and Edward O Laumann. "A Paradigm for Social Capital." *Rationality and Society* 10 no. 4 (Nov 1998).

Schneider, James J. *Vulcan's Anvil, The American Civil War and the Emergence of Operational Art*. Fort Leavenworth: Command and General Staff College, 1991.

Shay, Jonathan. "Trust: Touchstone for a Practical Military Ethos", *Spirit Blood and Treasure, The American Cost of Battle in the 21st Century*. ed. Donald Vandergriff. Novato, CA: Praesidio Press, 2001.

- Shils E A and M Janowitz. "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 12 (1948).
- Siebold, Guy L. "The Evolution of the Measurement of Cohesion." *Military Psychology* 11 no. 1 (1999).
- Stouffer S A et al. "The American Soldier: Combat and its Aftermath" *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II*, 2. (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1949).
- Sun Tzu. *The Art of War*. Trans and ed Lionel Giles. Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1910.
- Sydnor, Charles W Jr. *Soldiers of Destruction, The SS Death's Head Division, 1933-1945*. Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1977.
- Turabian, Kate L. *A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses, and Dissertations*, 6th Ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.
- United Kingdom Ministry of Defence. Army Doctrine Publication, *Volume 1, Operations*. London: HMSO, 1994.
- United Kingdom Ministry of Defence. Army Doctrine Publication, *Volume 2, Command*. London: HMSO, 1995.
- United Kingdom Ministry of Defence. *Design for British Military Operations, The British Military Doctrine*. London: HMSO, 1996.
- United Kingdom Ministry of Defence. *Army Equal Opportunities Commitment*. Available from:
http://www.army.mod.uk/careers/equal_opp.htm; Internet; accessed 15 October 2001.
- United States Congress. Senate Committee on Armed Services. *Posture Statement of General Henry H. Shelton, USA Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before the Committee on Armed Services*. 106th Congress. 8 February 2000. Available from:
<http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/core/Posture00.html>; Internet; accessed 15 October 2001.
- United States Department of the Army. *Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study Report to the Army*. Available from:
<http://www.army.mil/features/ATLD/ATLD.htm>; Internet; accessed 9 November 2001.
- United States Department of the Army. *FM 3-0 Operations*. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2001.
- Widmeyer W N, L R Brawley and A V Carron. *The Measurement of Cohesion in Sport Teams: The Group Environment Questionnaire*. London: 1985.